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Despite being a maritime nation whose sea-dependence is almost comparable to 
island nations or nations with long coastlines and limited land frontiers, Pakistan has not 
been able to effectively exploit the sea and its resources.  The geo-strategic location of 
the country and the geo-politics surrounding it makes the access to sea extremely 
important.   More than 95 percent of country’s international trade is routed through the 
sea, which in 2003-04 approximately amounted to 36.3 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).1  However, despite such heavy dependence, the maritime sector has been 
neglected primarily because of the continental mindset of the ruling elite.  Over decades, 
this neglect has deteriorated the existing infrastructure and, as a consequence, the country 
has a non-performing shipbuilding industry, a declining merchant marine, and largely 
unexploited offshore natural resources.  The Pakistan Navy, as an element of military 
power at sea, receives the least priority amongst the armed forces has never been 
accorded its rightful role in the overall national security strategy of the country.   
As a result of this neglect, the maritime sector has failed to develop and is 
contributing inadequately to the overall economic growth.  In terms of national security 
the overwhelming dependence on seaborne trade, reliance on co-located ports at 
Karachi, 2  and a weak navy to protect the maritime interests presents critical 
vulnerabilities considering the ongoing hostility with neighboring India.  
                                                 
1 Total value of exports and imports for FY 2003-2004 stood at $24.9 billion. See Economic Survey 
2003-2004, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-
trade.PDF (1 September 2004).  GDP of Pakistan in 2003 was $68.6 billion. See The World Bank country 
data on Pakistan, http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=/data/countrydata/aag/pak_aag.pdf 
(10 September 2004) 
2 Port Qasim is situated 52 kilometers east of Karachi.  See Figure 1. The third commercial port at 
Gwadar is under construction and its first phase will be completed in January 2005.  
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There is, however, a glimmer of hope, which reflects the strategic shift in thinking of 
policymakers in Pakistan and a probable reversal of long endured neglect of the maritime 
sector.  Construction of a deep-sea port at Gwadar, and introduction of business friendly 
policies for revival of shipping industry and exploitation of offshore resources are a few 













Figure 1: Coastal Map of Pakistan 
Development of maritime sector in Pakistan is important for both economic 
growth and the national security of the country.  In terms of economy, the maritime 
sector can diversify the economic base and stimulate economic growth.  A strong Navy is 
necessary not only for protection of economic maritime interests against predation and 
coercion but also to safeguard the strategic interests of the country.  At present the true 
potential of maritime sector is underexploited and thus is unable to significantly 
contribute to the economic growth of the country.  The Pakistan Navy as an element of 
military power at sea has never been developed as an effective element of overall military 




it for sustained economic growth.  It will also help in diversifying the economic base, 
which continues to rely heavily on agriculture.  Policymakers in Pakistan need to look 
beyond their continental biases and develop the navy as an effective element of military 
strategy.  The Pakistan Navy must be accorded its due role in the overall military strategy 
and developed as a credible conventional and strategic force to safeguard strategic 
interests of the country.   
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Contribution of Maritime Sector in Economic Growth 
Achieving sustained economic growth is one of the biggest challenges faced by 
Pakistan.  It would not be wrong to say that retarded economic growth, poverty and lack 
of economic opportunities are some of the most important reasons for growing frustration 
amongst the people, which in some cases translate to extremism and even terrorism.  The 
maritime sector in Pakistan has the potential to contribute significantly in the overall 
economic growth in many ways.  A thriving shipping industry can help in saving foreign 
exchange, reduce freight cost and thus promote country’s foreign trade.  Moreover, it can 
earn revenues from profitable shipping operation, create added employment 
opportunities, and assure adequate and reliable shipping services.  Ports provide the link 
between the sea and land transports and are a great source of revenue generation.  The 
most profound economic aspect of ports is their ability to act as a hub of economic 
activity in the surrounding region.  In the case of Pakistan, the emergence of Gwadar as a 
deep-sea port is extremely important because of its strategic location to attract the trade 
from Central Asian States and act as a major transshipment port.  Another spin-off effect 
of Gwadar Port is the development of infrastructure in coastal areas and improvement in 
socio-economic condition of the people in region, both of which have been neglected 
since independence of the country in 1947.   
The shipbuilding industry in Pakistan is facing severe financial difficulties in the 
absence of work and is continuously burdening government resources for its existence.  
Except for a short period in the 1970s, the shipbuilding industry has never been able to 
operate profitably.  Since it is a strategic capability that the country cannot afford to 
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permanently lose, immediate attention is required to make it financially self-sustaining.  
Exploitation of offshore natural resources promises tremendous economic potential.  At 
present the activity is restricted to living resources in terms of marine fisheries, which is a 
major source of employment in coastal areas.  The activities of Pakistani fishermen are 
largely confined to territorial waters, and a vast expanse of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) remains unexploited.  In the absence of modern processing plants, fish is exported 
in raw form as against a value-added product, which would provide a greater margin of 
profit.  Exploration of offshore energy and mineral resources can change the outlook of 
Pakistan’s economy if a major discovery is made in the future.  This sector has remained 
neglected in the past.  However, with the introduction of investment friendly policies for 
offshore exploration, private investors have shown a renewed interest to undertake 
offshore exploration of energy resources.   
2. The Question of National Security 
Ever since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has lived in an atmosphere of 
continuous animosity with neighboring India.  The countries have gone to war thrice, and 
the possibility of such an eventuality in the future cannot be ruled out.  Even the overt 
demonstration of nuclear weapons capability by the two countries has done little to 
improve the security situation in the region.  This security competition has two main 
challenges vis-à-vis the maritime strategy.   
First, depletion of national merchant marine in Pakistan has forced the country to 
depend on foreign carriers for international trade.  In case of war or a heightened state of 
tension, reliance on foreign carriers can have adverse effects on the seaborne trade of the 
country.  Foreign ships may refuse to ply in a war prone zone or increase the freight and 
insurance charges unacceptably high.  This phenomenon is quite plausible considering 
the fact insurance charges for shipping bound to Pakistan skyrocketed during the U.S. 
attack on Afghanistan in 2001 and again during the second Gulf War in 2003.3  
Second, navies, as an element of military power at sea, are developed by maritime 
nations to protect their strategic and economic interests.  The development of the Pakistan 
                                                 
3 Syed M. Aslam, “Impact of War on Foreign Trade,” Pakistan and Gulf Economist (31 May -06 
April, 2003). 
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Navy has not been proportionate with the growth of country’s strategic and maritime 
interests.  In fact, the continental mindset of the policymakers has not been able to 
appreciate a due role for the navy in the overall defense of the country and, as a 
consequence, it is afforded the least priority.  Over several decades, this neglect has 
created a conventional imbalance in favor of the Indian Navy, which enjoys a 5:1 
advantage over the Pakistan Navy in terms of combat vessels, air assets and manpower.4   
This thesis argues that significant development of the Pakistan Navy is important 
for Pakistan for two reasons.  First, limited conventional war at sea between India and 
Pakistan is more likely in future considering Indian Navy’s conventional advantage; 
India’s continued perception that it could credibly threaten the limited use of force,5 and 
the fact that mutual nuclear deterrence makes the prospect of limited conventional 
conflict at sea more likely. 6   Second, mutual nuclear deterrence in South Asia is 
inherently unstable because both the countries do not possess credible second-strike 
capability, which leaves a chance of preemption in face of an imminent threat.  
Moreover, India’s quest to acquire Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 
theater ballistic missile defense system, and sea-based second-strike capability would 
give India the qualitative advantage needed to maintain a credible attack capability, 
which can result in breakdown of mutual deterrence.7  It may not be possible for Pakistan 
to achieve parity in every move that India makes towards acquisition of conventional and 
strategic weapons due to economic reasons.  However, Pakistan must improve the 
conventional warfighting capability of its navy to offset the conventional military 
superiority of the Indian Navy and develop a sea-based second-strike capability to 
maintain strategic equilibrium in the region.  For Pakistan, acquisition of a sea-based 
second-strike capability is inevitable because it is only a matter of time before India will 
                                                 
4 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, Indian Navy, 16 April 2004.  
5 “India and Pakistan: Towards Greater Bilateral Stability,” Strategic Survey 2003-2004, 234. 
6 Rear Admiral Richard Hill, RN (Retd), “Do We Need a New Definition of Medium Maritime 
Power?” in Maritime Forces in Global Security, ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax: Centre 
for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994), 260.  




have a sea-based nuclear weapons capability, which would change the strategic equation 
in the region and may undermine existing nuclear deterrence equation.   
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis considers individual elements of maritime strategy to analyze their 
relevance vis-à-vis economic development and national security of the country.  The 
thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter II deals with the seaborne trade and shipping 
industry.  This chapter establishes the relationship between economic growth and the 
seaborne trade, and analyses the role of shipping industry to support it.  The shipping 
industry in Pakistan has suffered due to wrong economic policies of the government and 
the exclusion of private sector to invest in the industry.  Revival of shipping industry in 
Pakistan is important both for economic growth and the national security of the country.  
However, such a development can only be realized with effective participation of the 
private sector.  The policymakers in Pakistan must restore the lost trust of business 
community, acknowledge their right to make profit, and provide a level playing field to 
private and public sector for achieving meaningful investment and development of the 
shipping industry.   
Chapter III discusses three elements related to maritime power, ports, 
shipbuilding industry, and exploitation of natural resources.  Each element is analyzed 
separately with regards to its strategic and economic significance.  Ports are important for 
their revenue-generation potential and also because of their catalytic role in promoting 
wide-ranged economic activities.  The development of ports in Pakistan has progressed 
very slowly.  However, this has changed in the last couple of years.  The government in 
Pakistan has embarked on an ambitious plan to develop Gwadar as a deep-sea port and 
improve the existing infrastructure in the coastal regions.  This is a step in the right 
direction and is expected to bring great economic benefit to the country and uplift the 
socio-economic conditions in the neglected areas along Makran coast.  Gwadar is 
expected to provide sea access to land-locked Central Asian States via Afghanistan and 
also to the western provinces of China.  The most important prospect is the ability of 
Gwadar to become a major transshipment port in the region in the long-term.  The port 
shall also provide another operating base to the Pakistan Navy west of Karachi.  The 
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shipbuilding industry in Pakistan remains economically unhealthy.  However, because of 
its strategic importance in supporting indigenous ship construction activities of the navy, 
it is unwise to lose this ability.   
The Long-term economic revival of the shipbuilding sector is only possible 
through foreign assistance both in terms of financial investment and technological 
assistance.  Pakistan must explore the possibility of a joint collaboration with China, 
which is emerging as a major shipbuilder in the world.  Exploitation of offshore resources 
has progressed very slowly and is mainly confined to living resources.  The government 
has been able to attract some investment in exploration of offshore energy resources but 
the results of these the exploration activities are unknown as yet.  There are two main 
challenges, which need to be addressed by the government immediately.  Environmental 
pollution is depleting and contaminating offshore living resources and needs serious 
efforts by the government to control the flow of 300 million gallons of untreated 
domestic and industrial waste into the sea.  Pakistan is slow in preparing its claim for the 
continental shelf and must accelerate the work for timely completion of scientific and 
technical data.  The final date for submitting the claim to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is 13 May 2009.  
Chapter IV is about the Pakistan Navy as an element of military power at sea.  
This chapter analyzes the strategic and economic maritime interests of Pakistan, which is 
why it needs to maintain a navy.  The development of the Pakistan Navy has remained 
neglected due to a number of reasons; the most important being the continental mindset 
of the ruling elite and their inability to perceive a definitive role for the navy in the 
overall military strategy.  Despite the challenges that it faced since independence of the 
country in 1947, the Pakistan Navy has managed to struggle along and maintain itself as a 
small cohesive force.  However, the decades of neglect have left the navy in a very 
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Indian Navy.  The conventional imbalance 
between the two navies is increasing.  It is argued that acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
both Pakistan and India and the continuing rivalry between the two countries have made 
the Pakistan Navy very important for national security of the country and stability in the 
region.  This argument is built on two hypotheses: Limited conventional war between the 
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two navies in a future conflict more not less likely, acquisition of sea-based second-strike 
capability by India in near future will disturb the strategic equilibrium and may lead to 
the failure of nuclear deterrence.  The policymakers in Pakistan will have to give up their 
continental bias and develop the navy as an important instrument of military strategy.  
Chapter V summarizes major findings of the thesis and offers conclusions about 
the role of maritime strategy in economic development and national security of Pakistan.  
Maritime sector as a whole has remained neglected in Pakistan despite its heavy 
dependence on seaborne trade.  The shipping industry is in disarray because of wrong 
economic policies adopted in the past.  Development of domestic shipping industry is not 
possible without active participation of the private sector.  To achieve any meaningful 
investment by the private sector, the government must provide a business friendly 
environment and restore the lost trust of business community.  Shipbuilding industry in 
Pakistan has for most of the time remained a financially troubled industry and chances for 
its recovery in near future are not very optimistic.  Since Pakistan needs the industry for 
strategic reasons to support its indigenous ship construction programs, Pakistan must look 
for possible Chinese financial and technological assistance for revival of the industry in 
the long-term.   
The development of ports has remained slow in the past.  However, the trend has 
changed and the there is an increased emphasis on development of ports and up gradation 
of existing infrastructure.  Pakistan is expected to benefit from the development of 
Gwadar port in attracting trade from land-locked neighboring states and transformation of 
the port as a major transshipment or hub port in the long-term.  Pakistan has not been able 
to effectively exploit the living and non-living resources present in its EEZ.  While some 
efforts are underway to explore energy resources in offshore areas, there is lot to be done 
to benefit from the untapped offshore resources.  Pakistan also must tackle the problem of 
environmental pollution, which is severely degrading its living resources.  Moreover, if 
Pakistan is interested in claiming additional sea area in its continental shelf, it will have 
to expedite the collection of scientific data for preparation of such claim before the cut 
off date in 2009.   
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The Pakistan Navy as an element of military power at sea has always remained 
neglected because of the continental mindset of the ruling elite and overwhelming 
influence of the army.  Such attitude has hampered the development of the navy, which is 
in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Indian Navy.  However, Pakistan cannot 
afford to ignore the development of its navy in future.  The strategic parity that Pakistan 
achieved with India after going nuclear in 1998, demands the development of sea-based 
second-strike capability to counter similar attempts being taken by India.  Moreover, 
Pakistan must improve the conventional warfighting capability of its navy to reduce the 
chances of any misadventure by the Indian Navy in a future conflict.  Both these aspects 
are important for national security of the country in particular and for maintaining 
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II. SEABORNE TRADE AND SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN 
PAKISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
International trade has always been important in stimulating economic growth.  
With the push towards globalization and the advancement in the means of transportation, 
world economies have become increasingly interdependent. Openness to international 
trade is widely believed to accelerate economic growth,8 which in part explains the rising 
trend in international trade.  Sea provides the cheapest and the most efficient mode of 
transportation and more than 90 percent of the global trade is routed through the sea.  
Because of its geography and the geo-political situation in the region, Pakistan is heavily 
dependent on sea for its international trade, which in 2003-2004 approximately accounted 
for 36.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Over 95 percent of country’s 
international trade is routed through the sea.   
While seaborne trade is the backbone of Pakistani economy, the domestic 
shipping industry has remained neglected in the past.  As a result it is barely self-
sustaining and contributes insignificantly to the overall economy.  The number of ships in 
the national flag carrier, the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, has steadily shrunk 
since the mid 1970s.  At present, the Pakistani merchant fleet transports only 5 percent of 
the total seaborne trade as against the 40 percent outlined by the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for national carriers.9 Consequently 
the country is spending around $1.5 billion in foreign exchange annually on freight 
                                                 
8 David Dollar and Aart Kraay, “Trade, Growth, and Poverty,” Development Research Group, The 
World Bank, March 2001, http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/Trade5.pdf (5 September 
2004) 
9 Pakistan has ratified the UNCTAD ‘Convention of a Code of Conduct for Liner Conference,’ of 
April 7, 1974.  Chapter II of the convention explains that the national liner companies of each of the two 
countries whose mutual trade is carried in conference ships has the same rights as regards sharing the 
freight and quantity of cargo in the mutual foreign trade.  Third country liner companies (if there are any) 
are entitled to obtain a considerable part, e.g., 20 percent of the freight and quantity of cargo of this trade. 
This is commonly referred as 40/40/20 sharing clause.  See Hans Ludwig et al, 25 Years of World Shipping 
(London: Fairplay Publications, 1984), 180-181and “Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner 
Conferences,” http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/liner1974.html (7 October 2004) 
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charges, which is approximately 2.2 percent of the GDP. 10   Uninterrupted flow of 
seaborne trade is important not only for economic growth but also for national security of 
the country simply because of the reason that the economy and national security are 
interdependent.  In case of Pakistan it is even more important because the country is 
heavily dependent on important energy resources.   
The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain the importance of seaborne trade and 
the shipping industry as two main elements of a maritime strategy for Pakistan and to 
analyze why Pakistan has failed to develop its shipping industry.  The impact on 
economic growth and implications for Pakistan’s national security as a result of declining 
merchant marine will also be discussed.  The neglect of shipping industry in Pakistan 
cannot be attributed to a single factor.  The present state of shipping industry in Pakistan 
is because of a number of reasons such as; ill-advised economic policies, capital-
intensive nature of shipping industry, unabated public corruption, continental mindset of 
the ruling elite, and the prevalent geo-political situation.  The nationalization of private 
industry in mid 1970s can be identified as the single major source of the decline of not 
only the shipping industry but also a number of other industrial sectors.    
The impact of a neglected shipping industry on economic growth is two pronged.  
First, is the inability to fully exploit the revenue generation potential from a modest 
shipping industry.  Second, and more important, is the negative impact where the 
government is required to spend hard earned resources as freight bills for foreign carriers 
or to bail out inefficient and unsustainable public owned enterprises.  Moreover, 
economic growth and national security are somewhat interrelated or interdependent 
concepts.   In the case of Pakistan, co-located ports at Karachi, a depleted merchant 
marine, an overwhelming dependence on seaborne trade and a weak navy present a 
multitude of vulnerabilities.  This is especially so because of the continued rivalry with 
neighboring India and a history of armed conflicts in the past.  Any escalation short of 
war is enough to disrupt the seaborne trade and deter neutrals from plying in a war prone 
                                                 
10 Regional Seminar on Liberalization of Maritime Transport Services under WTO GATS, Country 
Report Pakistan, http://www.unescap.org/tctd/nvg/wtogats2002files/pakistan_wtogats.pdf (16 May 2004); 
GDP of Pakistan for 2003 was $68.6 billion, http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-
bin/sendoff.cgi?page=/data/countrydata/aag/pak_aag.pdf (10 September 2004). 
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zone, or it is likely to increase insurance charges as has happened in the past.  Both the 
scenarios may have enormous negative effects on the economic growth and national 
security of the country.    
In this chapter, the relationship between seaborne trade and economic growth, and 
their interdependence, is discussed.  It is followed by a look at the seaborne trade of 
Pakistan and its relative importance vis-à-vis economic growth of the country.  The 
supporting role of shipping industry in promoting seaborne trade and economic growth is 
discussed thereafter.  The discussion on the shipping scenario in Pakistan is preceded by 
an analysis of potential advantages and disadvantages for developing countries to invest 
in shipping sector.  The historical evolution of the shipping industry in the country and its 
continued decline is discussed before analyzing the challenges faced by the industry and 
the prospects for its revival. 
 
B. SEABORNE TRADE 
1. Seaborne Trade and Economic Growth 
The world has witnessed an increasing reliance on international trade as the 
primary engine of economic growth and development.  This is a major ideological shift: 
many economies in the past have pursued developmental strategies emphasizing self-
sufficiency and protection of domestic markets.  However, at present there is a growing 
consensus that the route to prosperity lies in integration with the global economy.11  From 
1950 to 1990, the value of trade grew almost 1.5 times as fast as the world economy, 
while in the last decade; world trade is now growing at around 2.2 times the rate of global 
economic growth.12  
The bulk of international trade is routed through sea, which explains why 
seaborne trade remains one of the great economic success stories of the post-Second 
World War economies.  Hill argues that seaborne trade not only contributes significantly 
                                                 
11 “Regional Shipping and Port Development Strategies – Under a Changing Maritime Environment”, 
Maritime Policy Planning Model by UNESCAP/UNDP, 4, 
http://www.unescap.org/tctd/pubs/files/mppm_nov2001_escap2153.pdf  (9 May 2004). 
12 Ibid., 5. 
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to economy but serves as a motor for the domestic economy and a catalyst for 
development and modernization.  As evidence, he notes that in majority of the world’s 
top thirty economies, seaborne exports make up over 10 percent of the national income.13  
In case of Pakistan, seaborne exports constitute 17 percent of the GDP.14    Between 1945 
and 2002 the seaborne trade grew from 0.55 billion tons to 5.88 billion tons.15 Over the 
next ten years, total maritime trade is forecast to grow at between 3.5 percent and 4.0 
percent per annum—slightly higher than was experienced through the 1990s. 16  The 
growth in the international container trade, which is ultimately driven by economic 
growth, has far exceeded the rate of growth of maritime trade as a whole.17  For example, 
while total maritime trade volume grew at an average of 3.3 percent per annum from 
1987 to 1999, the containerized cargoes grew at an annual average growth rate of 8.3 
percent over the same period, leading to an increase of 160 percent in total maritime 
container movements.  Due to the increasing importance of transshipment movements 
(the transfer of cargo from one ship to another) the number of containers handled in the 
world’s ports grew at any even faster rate—in excess of 9 percent.18   
The size of trade volume for different countries varies from few hundred thousand 
tons at one extreme to millions of tons at the other.  There are a number of variables, 
which determine the size of the seaborne trade of a country.   Stopford argues that the 
most obvious explanation for the size of a country’s seaborne trade is the size of its 
economy.  The bigger the economies the greater they are likely to generate the trade.  
However, the relationship between trade and the GNP is not static but dynamic.  When 
countries grow, their economies change and so does their trade.  Growth in trade differs 
                                                 
13 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Power, 31. 
14 GDP of Pakistan in 2003 was $68.6 billion, see http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-
bin/sendoff.cgi?page=/data/countrydata/aag/pak_aag.pdf (10 September 2004). 
15 Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition (London: Routledge Press, 1997), 250, and 
“Review of Maritime Transport, 2003”, UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2003, 4. 
16 “Regional Shipping and Port Development Strategies—Under a Changing Maritime Environment”, 
Maritime Policy Planning Model by UNESCAP/UNDP, 15, 
http://www.unescap.org/tctd/pubs/files/mppm_nov2001_escap2153.pdf (9 May 2004). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 13. 
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widely for countries at different stages of economic development and the margin for 
growth for countries at the initial stages of economic development is phenomenal.19   
Since the seaborne trade remains an economic phenomenon, other variables such as 
landmass of the country and the size of its population have an insignificant effect on it.  It 
is the economic activity, which creates the demand for imports and the supply of exports, 
not the number of people.20 
2. Seaborne Trade of Pakistan 
Due to its geographic location and the geopolitical environment in the region, 
Pakistan depends heavily on the sea for its existence.  More than 95 percent of country’s 
trade is through the sea. Pakistan’s exports and imports have shown a steady increase in 
the past.  According to the “Economic Survey 2003-2004” published by government of 
Pakistan, the exports for fiscal year 2003-2004 have risen to $12.1 billion, while imports 
were targeted at $12.8 billion for the same period.21  Combined together, the total trade 
value amounts to $24.9 billion, which is approximately 36.3 percent of the GDP.22   
The exports over the past decade have registered a steady growth, however, the 
imports fluctuated due to financial problems in the mid and late 1990s as shown in Figure 
1.  The average annual growth rate of imports and exports is reflected in Figure 2. There 
are about 100 countries, which trade by sea with an annual trade volume exceeding 
100,000 tons.  According to the sea trade data of 1990-1991, Pakistan is ranked 45th 
among the first 100 sea-trading nations with a total trade volume of 25 million tons.23  
The total trade volume increased to 41.5 million tons in 2003, registering an average 
annual increase of approximately 1.25 million tons or 5 percent per annum.24  During the 
                                                 
19 Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition, 240-243. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Economic Survey 2003-2004, Government of Pakistan, 
http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.PDF (12 September 2004). 
22 GDP of Pakistan for 2003 was $68.6 billion.  See World Bank data,  http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-
bin/sendoff.cgi?page=/data/countrydata/aag/pak_aag.pdf (10 September 2004). 
23 Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition, 250. 
24 Regional Seminar on Liberalization of Maritime Transport Services under WTO GATS, Country 
Report Pakistan, http://www.unescap.org/tctd/nvg/wtogats2002files/pakistan_wtogats.pdf (7 May 2004). 
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year 2002 the growth of the economic output for developing economies reached 3.3 
percent, well above the world average of 1.9 percent.   
In South Asia, Pakistan almost doubled its output growth rate to 4.6 percent.25 Real GDP 
for 2002-2003 was 5.1 percent and during the last fiscal year (2003-2004), it registered a 
growth of 6.4 percent.26 The prospects for the future are also promising with an expected 
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25 “Review of Maritime Transport, 2003”, UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2003, 1. 
26 Economic Survey 2003-2004, Government of Pakistan, 
http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/01-Growth.pdf (12 September 2004). 
27 “Pakistan at a Glance,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-
bin/sendoff.cgi?page=/data/countrydata/aag/pak_aag.pdf (10 September 2004). 
 17
With the macro-economic stability and higher growth rates witnessed in the last 
couple of years, some economists argue that Pakistan is at the take-off stage,28 which is 
defined as an economy in the second stage of economic development where there is a 
certain degree of capital accumulation to provide the foundation of economic growth.29  
Here the sea trade is small but very active and fast growing.  The recent turn in the 
economic situation in Pakistan and the projected growth of trade for the year 2004-05 
(export targets of $13.7 billion and imports $16.7 billion) reflect this change.30 This is 
also explained by the fact that each country has its own unique Trade Development Cycle 
(TDC), which depends on its factors of production as well as cultural and commercial 
considerations. 31  At the earliest stages of development, imports of manufactures are paid 
for by cash crop exports.  As industry expands, raw materials generate demand for sea 
transport if they are not available locally and are paid for by exports of semi-
manufactures and any primary exports that are available.   
The composition of Pakistan’s exports has changed significantly over the years 
and is indicative of the progression along its trade development cycle where the reliance 
on primary commodity exports has gradually decreased.  The principal changes have 
been the steep fall in the shares of primary and semi-manufactured exports and equally 
sharp increase in the share of manufactured exports.  The share in terms of value of 
primary commodities and semi-manufactures in the overall exports has reduced from 19 
percent and 24 percent respectively in 1990-1991 to 10 percent and 12 percent in 2002-
2003.  On the other hand share of manufactured goods has risen from 57 percent to 78 
percent in the same period. 32   The changing composition of exports suggests that 
Pakistan no longer relies heavily on primary commodities exports for foreign exchange 
earnings.  
                                                 
28 Ashfaque H. Khan, “The Economy at Take-Off Stage,” Dawn (Karachi), 5 May 2003, 
http://www.dawn.com/2003/05/05/ebr3.htm (17 October 2004). 
29 Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition, 241. 
30 Dawn (Karachi), 23 July 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/23/top1.htm (15 September 2004). 
31 Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition, 242. 
32 Economic Survey 2003-2004, Government of Pakistan,  
http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.PDF (12 September 2004). 
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Pakistan's imports are highly concentrated in a few items: machinery, petroleum 
and petroleum products, chemicals, transport equipments, edible oil, iron and steel, 
fertilizer, and tea. These eight categories of imports accounted for 75.2 percent of total 
imports during 2001-2002.  Among these categories, machinery, petroleum and 
petroleum products, and chemicals accounted for almost 60.1 percent of total imports. 
Considerable structural changes have taken place in some categories of imports over the 
years. The share of machinery has declined on account of sliding investment, but during 
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 its share has increased due to higher imports of power 
generating machinery, electrical and textile machinery and construction & mining 
machinery. The share of chemicals depicted a gradual rising trend, while that of 
petroleum and petroleum products picked up, mainly on account of rising domestic 
demand and higher international prices. Pakistan currently imports two thirds of its total 
requirement of fuel oil, and at the projected consumption rate, is poised to become one of 
the largest importers of fuel oil in the Asia-Pacific region by 2005.33 
 
C. SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Shipping and economic development are increasingly linked.  The health of the 
shipping industry is therefore of great importance not only to the major shipping nations 
but to all nations.34  The nations of the world rely more heavily and trade linkages 
increasingly foster global interdependence.  Shipping services are essential for 
international trade, because over 90 percent of all international trade measured in weight 
and volume, is transported by water.35  Lovett argues that there is strong relationship 
between growth in trade and a healthy merchant marine. 
                                                 
33 Hassaan Vahidy, Fereidun Fesharaki, “Pakistan's Gas Discoveries Eliminate Import Need,” Oil & 
Gas Journal Tulsa, 28 January 2002.  
34 Ernest Gabriel Frankel, The World Shipping Industry (London: Croom Helm Publishers, 1987), xi. 
35 Sam J Tangredi, ed. Globalization and Maritime Power, (Washington D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 2002), 3.  
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In most successful nations there has been a commitment to maritime 
policy as part of a strong trade policy.  A healthy merchant marine 
promotes successful exports, profitable trading ventures, and a national 
outreach to get the best available products and technology.  In contrast, to 
rely mainly upon foreign vessels, traders, suppliers, and manufactures 
leads to passivity in external relations and under-achievement.  As 
economies become sluggish, inward looking, they typically reduce their 
savings and investment; they neglect their industry and productivity 
potential, and erode their competitive vitality in world markets. 36 
The world merchant fleet stood at 844.2 million tons as on 1 January 2003, 
representing a 2.3 percent increase over 2002.37  Despite its enormous technological 
evolution, the shipping industry continues to provide efficient and low cost 
transportation, which is generally assumed to be a necessary condition for the 
maintenance and expansion of trade.   Coal and oil cost little more in the mid-1990s than 
in the late 1940s.38  In addition there is a symbiotic relationship between transportation 
and trade.  Contrary to the general belief that transportation is derived demand depending 
on trade, an increasing number of trades in developing countries are in part derived from 
efficient, low-cost transportation.39   
The historical importance of merchant marine under national flag as an essential 
constituent of maritime power that enabled the state to ensure continuance of its trade, 
earned profits, created wealth and provided employment cannot be overemphasized.  
However, maritime strategists argue that developed countries have over the period of 
time deliberately acquiesced to a catastrophic decline of their merchant marine.40  The 
continued decline in the status of merchant shipping in developed countries, which 
facilitates 97 percent of world trade and consumes only 3 percent of world energy, is 
because of the fact that shipping has lost its constituency leading to an erosion of political 
                                                 
36 William A. Lovett, “Realistic Maritime Renewal,” in U.S. Shipping Policies and the World Market 
ed. William A. Lovett (Westport: Quorum Books, 1996), 317. 
37 “Review of Maritime Transport, 2003”, UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2003, 19. 
38 Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition, 4. 
39 Frankel, The World Shipping Industry, 110. 
40 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, 31. 
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and economic support.  This explains the declining trend of the shipping industry in 
developed countries and the institution of neglectful and shipping-hostile policies. 41 
These rigid and unfriendly policies are partly responsible for the drastic decline in the 
British fleet from 1,614 ships in 1975 to 272 ships in 1993.42 
The contrary is believed to be true in the developing countries, which regard a 
sizeable and flourishing merchant marine as something good.  This is despite the fact that 
shipping is a highly capital intensive industry, with a lot of risk involved to considerable 
fluctuations in demand and volatility in freight rates.43 The present share of developing 
countries in the total world tonnage is about 20.3 percent, out of which Asian countries 
own 74.1 percent.44  Developing countries have grown more rapidly than those of the rest 
of the world and have consequently become even more dependent on trade.  They are 
particularly dependent on trade with industrialized countries because of their need to 
market raw materials, agricultural products, and low technology manufactured products, 
as well as to import industrial goods.  The proportion of freight charges for developing 
countries is generally higher vis-à-vis developed countries.  Many developing countries 
blame the disproportionate share of international seaborne trade for the high freight rates 
charged to their trade.45  This is partially because of the lower trade volume generated by 
developing countries.  As the average unit value of their trade is lower than that of 
developed countries, and the average cost of transportation per unit of cargo is usually 
higher, the percentage costs of transport in developing countries international trade are 
generally higher than those assumed by developed countries.  Consequently, the 
developing countries spend over twice as much as or in some case over three times the 
amount spent by developed countries for transportation of international trade as 
                                                 
41 N. Shashikumar, “World Shipping Competition,” in U.S. Shipping Policies and the World Market 
ed. William A. Lovett (Westport: Quorum Books, 1996), 72. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Harald Hansen, The Developing Countries and International Shipping, (Washington: World Bank 
Staff Working Paper No. 502, 1981), iv.  
44 “Review of Maritime Transport, 2003”, UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2003, 27. 
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percentage of the value of their trade.46 To reduce the cost of their own trade, developing 
countries attempt in the participation of shipping their own trade.  Before studying the  
shipping scenario in Pakistan, it would be prudent here to analyze why developing 
countries in general invest in shipping and what are potential positive and negative 
effects of doing that.   
1. Potential Positive Aspects of Investment in Shipping Sector by 
Developing Countries 
Developing countries’ investment in shipping industry is generally based around 
five main reasons: saving foreign exchange, reducing freight cost and thus promoting the 
country’s foreign trade, reaping the benefit from profitable shipping operation, providing 
added employment, assuring adequate and reliable shipping services.47  The potential for 
avoiding substantial foreign exchange payments for maritime freight is often given by the 
developing countries as one important reason for investments in ocean-going shipping.  
Although the countries may achieve gross foreign exchange savings, the net savings from 
the national point of view will be significantly less depending on number of factors.  
These factors include: 48  
• The type of vessels involved and their age and cost structures under 
national and foreign flag;  
• The extent to which the vessel is acquired from abroad and the financing 
arrangements; 
• The extent to which the national resources are used in its operation (crew, 
management, repair facilities etc.); 
• The operating efficiency and level of profitability; 
• The impact of freight rates;  
• And the general conditions on the particular trade routes in question. 
 
The potential for bringing about lower freight charges and/or improved service is 
another reason cited for developing countries’ investment in shipping.  The existence of 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 111. 
47 Hansen, The Developing Countries and International Shipping, 26. 
48 Ibid. 
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national flag vessels may reduce the costs on particular commodities or may help avoid 
or modify freight increases; the opposite is also true if national flag vessels are not 
operated efficiently.  Efficient shipping operation has the potential to earn revenues, 
which is another reason why developing countries want to invest in shipping industry.  
The keyword here is efficient because in case of inefficient operation, shipping 
companies of developing countries have known to be earning marginal returns or losing 
money. 
Although the modern shipping provides little employment opportunities, it can 
have a great impact on employment generation through spin-off factors and linkage 
effects with trade.  Modern ships are increasingly becoming automated with much lesser 
manning requirements.  The over-manning of ships in developing countries offsets the 
advantage of low wages and increases overall the operating costs.  On the contrary 
investment in shipping has the potential to create employments in labor-intensive sectors 
like ship repairing, shipbuilding and other onshore jobs.  The extent of these economic 
linkages depends on how far shipping is planned as an integral part of the economy.   
Moreover the investment in national flag vessels for overseas trade may result in 
lowering freight cost, which could result in a multiplier effect of increased exports and 
increased employment opportunities in production of the commodities concerned. 
The availability of shipping services to meet part of a country’s foreign trade 
needs in case of war or other emergencies has been a consideration for development of 
many national merchant marines.  In addition, during the period of high worldwide 
demand and increased freight rates, the developing countries with small trade volume 
might find the availability of shipping services greatly reduced.  National defense 
considerations have been yet another reason for development or expansion of national 
merchant marines. 
2. Potential Negative Aspects of Investment in Shipping Sector by 
Developing Countries 
There are a number of factors, which may affect the potential benefits of 
developing countries from shipping investments.  However, they are not always 
counterproductive and do not restrict the developing countries in investing in shipping 
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sector.49  Shipping is a highly capital-intensive industry with modest direct employment 
creation effects.  This is particularly true for modern vessels such as container ships and 
large bulk carriers.  These vessels with lower costs, reliable fuel-efficient machinery and 
negligible maintenance cost less to run.  The requirement of capital often forces the 
developing countries to look for less expensive alternatives.  In some cases the need of 
capital may be reduced by using second-hand vessels, or by using leased or chartered 
vessels.  However, day-to-day cash costs are higher for old ships with ageing machinery 
requiring constant maintenance, a rusty hull requiring regular steel replacement and high 
fuel consumptions. In fact operation and maintenance costs of older ships in developing 
countries’ merchant fleets outweigh often their margin of earning a profit.   
Shipping is generally considered a risky business.  Adjustments to decrease in 
demand and fluctuation in freight rates can seriously affect the profitability of shipping 
companies.  If the growth in shipping is proportionate to or a little less than the growth in 
international trade, the shipping industry makes good profits.  However, if the world 
shipping exceeds the growth in international trade, it leads to reduced business for 
shipping companies, increased competitiveness, and lower freight rates.  Forecasting in 
shipping industry is highly unpredictable and speculative.  Stopford relates shipping to 
the game of poker, where the players must know the rules.  However, “winning at 
shipping game, like poker, also depends on probability, strategy, psychology and luck.”50 
Open registry shipping using crews from other developing countries or low-
waged developing countries may offset the potential comparative advantage, which some 
developing countries may have in shipping.  Moreover, the fact that some developed 
countries directly or indirectly subsidize their shipping industries, which therefore offer 
lower freight rates, can have a negative effect on the shipping investment in developing 
countries, but at the same time it favors trade by lowering freight rates. 
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D. SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN PAKISTAN—A TROUBLED HISTORY  
1. Historical Background 
History of shipping industry in Pakistan is a sad saga of lost opportunities.  It 
started with an optimistic note and progressed well till the mid 1970s.  Thereafter it 
stagnated for a while before continuing on a downward slope, which remains unchecked.  
At the time of independence, Pakistan’s merchant marine fleet comprised four small 
sized ocean going ships which increased to 14 in 1950 and reached 71 prior to separation 
of East Pakistan in 1971.51  In the sixties, the government of the day pursued progressive 
policies, which facilitated Pakistan in successfully achieving its maritime capabilities.  
East and West Pakistan home trade acted as a catalyst to profitable ship owning.  Karachi 
Port was considered as one of the best ports east of the Suez.  Hundreds of foreign vessels 
in a year used to anchor at the Port of Karachi for repairs and maintenance. The 
government and the country earned sizable foreign exchange and international goodwill. 
The Karachi Shipyard was booming, and there were dozens or more well established 
marine repair workshops that employed hundreds of skilled labors and imparted 
apprentice trainings.52 After the fall of East Pakistan in 1971, the coastal trade between 
the two wings finished and the national merchant marine had to compete internationally.  
Even before the industry was able to recover from the first shock, in 1974 the government 
nationalized most of the privately owned industries.  It was perhaps the single most 
damaging economic decision in the history of Pakistan economy.  The shipping industry, 
like most other major industries could not escape the change in policy.  It was a major 
setback, which ended a healthy competition between the public and private shipping 
sectors.53  The traditional ship owners disappeared from the scene ever since and have yet 
to make a comeback.   
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The government-owned Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, which was 
formed in 1979 when Pakistan Shipping Corporation and the National Shipping 
Corporation were merged, has mostly remained a financially troubled organization 
despite enjoying absolute monopoly in the shipping sector. 54   First, public owned 
enterprises are inherently inefficient.  Secondly and most importantly in the absence of 
competition from the private sector, it had no urge to be efficient.  There had been a 
steady decline since the last two decades from 54 ships (518,000 deadweight tonnage) in 
1982 to 13 vessels with deadweight tonnage of 229,579 tons in 2002-2003.55   The 
corporation has recently acquired three oil tankers for transportation of its crude oil 
requirements.  The latest figure stands at 14 vessels with deadweight tonnage of 470,326 
tons.56  During the period from July 2003 to March 2004, the shipping corporation earned 
revenue of Rs4.602 billion. 57   According to the country report on Pakistan (2002) 
published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the 
national flag carrier of Pakistan (PNSC) handles only 5 percent of seaborne cargo which 
is far less than the minimum required figure of 40 percent.58   
2. Pakistan’s Economic Compulsions 
Pakistan has a potential for substantial net foreign exchange savings from 
shipping because of the size and nature of its trade and resource situation.  The annual 
freight bill to foreign shipping companies was estimated to be around $1.3 billion in 
2002, which is a significant drain on the country’s foreign exchange considering the size 
of Pakistan economy.59  This figure is likely to increase because of the present surge in 
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economic growth and the subsequent increase in the trade volume.   The gross saving in 
case of national mercantile marine may not be significant as contested by some scholars 
but the prospects of saving the hard-earned foreign exchange for an economy like 
Pakistan cannot be overestimated.  This is especially because of the fact that the annual 
freight bill is termed as the second highest expenditure after the debt servicing and 
defense. 
There is enormous growth potential for national shipping industry.  At present, 
less than 5 percent of Pakistan’s total trade is being carried by the national mercantile 
marine, which is far less than the 40 percent share allowed to be transported on national 
merchant fleet outlined by the UNCTAD convention on code of conduct for liner 
conference.60  Considering the rapid growth in trade in the recent years and the present 
stagnation of the shipping industry, the total share of trade transported by the national 
shipping industry is going to shrink further and the country would be more dependent on 
foreign shipping for transportation of its trade.  Conversely this also means that there 
exists an even greater growth potential for investment in the shipping sector.    
The modern shipping industry does not generate many employment opportunities 
on board but there is a definite potential of on shore employment created by investment 
in shipping industry.  The unhealthy state of national mercantile marine is cited as one 
reason for increasing idleness of Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works, which was a 
booming industry during 1970s when it received repair/maintenance and new 
shipbuilding orders from the domestic shipping industry.61 Growth and development of 
national mercantile marine would help revive the shipbuilding and repair industry, which 
is otherwise laying idle and burdening national resources.  Moreover, investment in 
shipping industry is related to development of other services industries like marine 
insurance, ship finance organization, ship classification services, marine 
telecommunication services, marine training institutes and ship provisioning services.  
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All of these activities tend to be more labor-intensive, which means increased 
employment opportunities in these sectors. 
Pakistan has an environment that offers comparative advantage for investment in 
shipping sector such as maritime and naval background, well-established training 
infrastructure for merchant marine officers and ratings, an appropriate institutional 
framework to manage the industry, and significant economic linkages to make possible 
efficient and economical operation of national flag vessels in its foreign trade; all of 
which are considered as conducive conditions for investment in shipping sector.62   
The potential of profitable shipping operation to earn foreign exchange for the 
country is yet another consideration investment in shipping sector.  However, this is 
difficult to realize without the effective participation of private sector.  Pakistani ship 
owners in the private sector were badly discouraged by nationalization policy of the 
government and absolute monopoly of public sector in shipping industry till early 1990s.  
Most of them moved to invest elsewhere in the World.  This is evident from the fact that 
Pakistani businessmen owned 63 open-registry ships in 1984 with total tonnage 
exceeding 1.75 million tons.63 Whether or not Pakistani businessmen will be interested to 
bring their ships under Pakistan flag depends on the government’s ability to rebuild the 
lost trust and provide adequate incentives to invest. 
Investment in shipping can help reduce the balance of payment deficit.  The 
improvements in balance of payment by shipping the cargo on national mercantile marine 
can be realized in two ways.  First, by transporting own exports to foreign countries 
would mean the earning of foreign exchange.  Second, the country would not be required 
to pay foreign exchange to foreign ships as freight charges for its imports.  This may be 
viewed in light of higher freight charges paid by developing countries on average as 
compared to developed countries mainly because of less trade volume generated by these 
countries.  Inadequacy of merchant marine in Pakistan to protect domestic trade is a 
vulnerability, which is often exploited by foreign shipping companies.  Foreign carriers 
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monopolize the freight rates at their whim and the exporters are left with no option but to 
accept higher freight rates, which makes their products internationally uncompetitive.  
The most recent example is the decision of foreign shipping lines to increase freight 
charges after a deal for rice export to Sri Lanka was made public.  The freight charges 
were raised from $250 to $325 per ton from Karachi to Colombo.64  
The development of Gwadar deep-sea port is yet another reason for investment in 
national shipping industry for two reasons.  It has the potential to boost transit trade 
emanating from Central Asia and Afghanistan, and it can introduce some sort of potential 
for coastal shipping between Karachi and Gwadar.  In the long term, Pakistan plans for 
Gwadar Port to emerge as a major transshipment port in the region.  Apart from other 
benefits that such a proposition brings along, it would generate the need of niche or 
feeder shipping services to serve secondary ports in the region.  Pakistan can benefit from 
such a prospect by developing its own shipping industry to capture this market in future. 
3. Pakistan’s National Security Compulsions 
The availability of shipping services to meet country’s foreign trade needs in war 
or other emergencies has been a consideration in development of many national merchant 
marines. Though the national defense considerations fall outside the normal economic 
evaluation, they had been a very important consideration in development or expansion of 
national mercantile marines, for example in case of the United States, Israel and Korea.65  
The security compulsions of Pakistan vis-à-vis its needs to develop its national mercantile 
marine are related to its geopolitical situation and continued animosity with the 
neighboring India. Disruption or discontinuity of its foreign trade may not only have 
adverse effects on the economy, it is equally detrimental to country’s national security 
and its war fighting capability.  Deteriorating political conditions between the two 
neighbors has unfortunately being a recurring phenomenon in the recent past.  A 
heightened state of tension or an all-out war can seriously affect the seaborne trade of 
Pakistan due to its heavy reliance on foreign shipping.  The two most probable outcomes 
                                                 
64 Dawn (Karachi), 12 October 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/10/12/ebr10.htm (12 October 2004). 
65 Frankel, The World Shipping Industry, 42. 
 29
shall be discussed here in some detail.  First, a war in the region or a heightened state of 
tension  can  deter  neutral  foreign  shipping  from plying in a war prone zone.  This may  
result in denial of essential services for transportation of country’s trade.  The national 
mercantile marine in its present shape may find it increasingly difficult to meet country’s 
transportation requirements. 
Second, is the issue of increased insurance premiums for all cargo destined to or 
from a war zone.  Marine insurance is mainly divided into three categories; hull and 
machinery, cargo, protection and indemnity.  Hull and machinery policies protect the 
interests of ship owners against physical loss and damage, cargo policies protect the 
interests of cargo owners, and protection and indemnity protect ship owners from 
liabilities their vessels have incurred.  In case of war or heightened tension in the region 
additional war risk premium is imposed.  This was witnessed during the United States’ 
attack on Afghanistan in 2001 and again during the Iraq war in 2003.  Despite the fact 
that Pakistan was not involved in the conflict, its mere proximity to the region was 
sufficient justification for shipping companies to subject all cargo to and from the country 
to additional war surcharges.  For example after 1 April 2003, a war risk premium to the 
tune of $25 for a 20-foot container and $50 for a 40-foot container were imposed.66 As 
insurance costs are an in-built part of all foreign trade, the levy of war risk premium in 
case of war or escalated tension in the region, may take an extremely adverse toll on the 
economy of the country by pushing the shipping costs unacceptably high and making the 
exports uneconomical.  This has serious implications for a country like Pakistan with 
relatively fragile economy and overwhelming dependence on seaborne trade.  The 
situation becomes graver if we consider such a situation leading to ‘economic 
strangulation,’ which is defined as one of the thresholds that would (or could) lead to 
Pakistani nuclear retaliation.67  
4. Achievements and Challenges 
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After almost three decades of neglect, and continued inefficiency of government 
owned shipping sector, there is now a realization amongst the policy makers in Pakistan 
that the government alone cannot effectively meet the requirements of shipping sector 
because of its financial constraints and the capital intensive nature of the industry.  
Without effective participation by the private sector there can be no serious development 
in shipping industry.  Considering these aspects, the present government formulated a 
new Merchant Shipping Policy with the guidance and inputs of public and private sector 
experts and professionals as well as other stakeholders. The basic aim of this policy is to 
attract investment in this vital field through a predictable environment, and offering 
concrete incentives, assurances, easy rules, regulations and procedures.  Broad objectives 
of the policy stipulated by the government are reproduced below.68  
• To encourage Pakistan flag carriers in private sector;  
• To create a conductive environment that would help in the growth of the maritime 
sector;  
• De-regulate by providing a free environment for investment;  
• Enhance competitiveness of country’s merchant marine fleet through induction of 
new vessels and efficient marine services;  
• Ensure efficient operation of country’s ports, harbors and related services 
according to international standards;  
• Augment foreign exchange earnings by increasing the capacity of national flag 
carriers; thus reducing the present foreign freight bill;  
• Expand and upgrade Pakistan merchant fleet to increase the present share of cargo 
from 5 percent to 40 percent by year 2020 to meet the United National 
Conference on Trade and Development criteria;  
• Upgrade the human resource development facilities as per International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) conventions to train Pakistani mariners in accordance with 
international requirement;  
• To revive our shipbuilding industry and expand it to cater for at least 20 percent 
shipbuilding and 50 percent repair and maintenance needs of the National fleet;  
• The policy also proposes that ship owners of any trading vessel either bareboat or 
chartered under Pakistani flag be exempted from import duties and surcharges up 
to the year 2020;  
• Shipbuilding and ship repair be classified as category “A” industry and entitled to 
all incentives contained therein;  
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• In lieu of income tax; a tonnage tax @ $1.0 gross ton per annum irrespective of 
profit or loss be charged from the ship owners;  
• Ports to provide 10 percent reduced rates for all vessels berthed for repair and 
maintenance;  
• Ports will give equitable treatment to ships/crafts owned by private sector for 
berthing and use of other port facilities at par with public sector vessels.  
 
The new policy was generally considered to be business-friendly and it was 
widely believed that successful implementation of the policy would hopefully generate 
considerable economic activity and attract private sector investment in the shipping 
industry.  However, even after two years the response is anything but promising.  A 
number of reasons are responsible for this cold response.  First, announcing a good policy 
is one thing but it is the implementation that really matters.  This is not the first time that 
the government has announced a shipping policy to invite private investors.  The shipping 
sector was first deregulated in early 1990s and it was partially successful in attracting 
private sector investment. A number of applicants with plans to establish shipping 
companies were granted permission by the then government. But the pace of investment 
from the private sector remained markedly slow. Only a few companies were registered 
having two to three ships only. Much progress in this direction could not be made 
because the investment required to be mobilized by the private sponsors was 
understandably very sizeable while loan facilities were hardly available from the 
development financial institutions (DFIs), and foreign investment interest also largely 
kept to the side lines. At the same time, the local sponsors were also discouraged by 
certain mandatory requirements in the policy. Moreover, relatively high rates of import 
duty on ships combined with other conditions, which were not acceptable to the 
investors, prevented private investors both local and foreign, from participating in the 
development of shipping industry.69  
Subsequently, in 1998 the government announced another shipping policy, which 
again failed to attract private investment.  Restoring the trust of business community to 
reinvest in shipping industry after what it was made to suffer in previous years would 
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require sincere efforts and profound assurances from the policy makers to provide a level 
playing field and a business friendly environment.  A clear deviation from the stated 
policy of evenhandedness by the government is the controversial 10 years contract 
awarded to PNSC for import of crude oil, which was concluded while the new shipping 
policy was being finalized.  The private sector was kept in dark and hence could not 
compete for the deal.70  While such favoritism may temporarily provide relief to the 
ailing shipping corporation in the short term, it would prove detrimental to the objectives 
outlined in the new shipping policy and would not be helpful in restoring the confidence 
of private sector.   
Pakistan may consider creating a separate ministry for shipping, as is the case in 
neighboring India.  At present import requirements of various ministries are processed in 
individually with no central management. It is important to coordinate the shipping 
requirements of various ministries.  The centralization would help coordinate shipments 
of various commodities to ensure timely shipment at most economical rates for the 
overall benefits of the local people and the local shipping sector.  Moreover, Pakistan will 
have to remove the bureaucratic snags that unnecessarily impede legitimate business 
concerns of private investors.  The bureaucracy in Pakistan can hardly be termed business 
friendly.  Instead of providing efficient services, people are made to suffer inordinate 
delays, which is something the business community can afford the least.  It often leads to 
corruption and reduces the margin of profitability of private investors.  The government 
must make serious efforts to revamp the bureaucratic structure and make it more 
conducive and business friendly. 
 In order to achieve success in the shipping sector the government has to make 
owning a ship under Pakistan flag almost as profitable a venture as it could be anywhere 
else in the open registry countries, because that is where most of Pakistani ship owners 
moved after repressive policies adopted by the government.  Attracting the business 
community back would require offering great incentives to a profitable business and their 
right to make legitimate profit.  In fact no country, no matter where, progressed only 
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when its private sector engaged in the trade received the recognition and the right to 
make legitimate profits was duly acknowledged and accepted.  In such countries the 
government provided the opportunities for the private sector to capitalize and make the 
business a viable enterprise, which subsequently generated growth and development.  
While protectionism and reservation of government owned cargo for national flag 
carriers is a universally acceptable phenomenon in the shipping industry, the government 
must ensure that both public and private owned shipping companies are treated alike with 
no preference whatsoever to be given to the public entity.  Any disparity to prioritize state 
owned corporation over private sector would be counterproductive.  The same level of 
protectionism and subsidies to all private investors with respect to secure export cargo is 
almost essential to attract investment.  This aspect is absolutely crucial for any serious 
attempt to attract private investment in shipping sector.   
To improve the condition of state owned Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, 
the government would drastically need to cut non-productive expenditures and make the 
organization into a lean and efficient commercial organization.  An organization with 
continued financial difficulties and decreasing fleet could hardly afford to sustain top-
heavy management.  The corporation needs to concentrate on more profitable routes and 
update its existing fleet.  Instead of opting for preferential and ad hoc measure, the 
government must devise a long-term strategy for making the organization more 
profitable.  Sustaining the organization at the expanse of taxpayers, which are made to 
pay higher prices for fuel because the national shipping corporation is charging exorbitant 
freight charges,71 is definitely not a productive long-term strategy.  
 
E. CONCLUSION  
Integration into the global economy is fundamental to economic development and 
in this era of globalization world economies have increasingly become dependent on 
international trade.  The sea provides the cheapest means of communication, which 
explains why over 90 percent of international trade is routed through the sea.  The role of 
shipping industry is crucial in supporting the growth of international trade by providing 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
 34
an efficient and cost effective means of transportation. Due to its geography and the geo-
political situation in the region, Pakistan is heavily dependent on sea for its international 
trade.  The sea carries over 95 percent of Pakistan’s trade, which is approximately 36.3 
percent of its GDP.  However, despite such heavy reliance on seaborne trade, Pakistan’s 
shipping industry has remained neglected in the past.  The shipping industry in Pakistan 
started off at a good note and moderate growth was witnessed till early 1970s.  Thereafter 
it suffered because of the dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 followed by the 
unwise economic policies of the government in mid 1970s.  Nationalization of the 
shipping industry was a major blow, which scared away private investors and 
subsequently the nationalized shipping corporation continued on a downward trend 
mainly because there was no competition from the private sector.  The downward trend 
has so far continued unabated.   
Development of shipping industry is important for Pakistan both in terms of 
economic growth and national security.  A healthy shipping industry can save foreign 
exchange expended on freight charges, earn additional revenues, provide added 
employment opportunities, and most importantly protect and promote domestic trade 
from unfavorable rise in freight and insurance charges.  In terms of national security, a 
well-developed national merchant marine reduces the dependence on foreign carriers, 
which may not assure continuous supply in case of war or heightened tension.  This is 
especially relevant in case of Pakistan where national merchant marine transports only 5 
percent of the total cargo and risk of a conflict with neighboring India in future remains a 
possibility.  After decades of neglect, the government has realized that involvement of 
private sector is extremely important to achieve any meaningful development in the 
shipping industry.  The newly announced Merchant Shipping Policy by the government is 
generally considered as a step in the right direction.  The incentives announced in the 
policy were unprecedented in the shipping policies announced by the past governments.   
However, it is important for the government to prove its sincerity vis-à-vis 
promulgation of the policy and protection of genuine interests of the business community 
in addition to creating a level playing field to attract the private investors. The response 
of business community has not been very warm and they are extremely cautious in 
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making a come back.  This cautious attitude of private investors is understandable 
considering enormous capital investment requirements and the checkered history of the 
treatment meted out to them in the past.  The government must make a thorough appraisal 
of the requirements of existing and potential investors and ensure that incentives offered 
are sufficient to inspire ideas of proportionate risk-taking.  Moreover, the bureaucratic 
institutions involved in functioning of shipping industry must be made business friendly 
and the legitimate right of business community to make profit must be acknowledged if 
any serious investment is expected in this sector.  The following recommendations are 
made with respect to the development of the shipping industry in Pakistan: 
• The government must restore the lost trust of business community in order to 
attract investment in shipping sector.  The government must demonstrate sincerity 
in promulgating the declared policy and its actions must not contradict the policy 
guidelines. 
• The government must make a thorough appraisal of the requirements of existing 
and potential investors and ensure that incentives offered are sufficient to inspire 
ideas of proportionate risk-taking.  The incentives offered should be equal to 
those offered elsewhere in the world especially in the open-registry countries.   
• The right of private sector to make legitimate profit must be acknowledged and 
the government must ensure that both private and public sectors are treated 
equally.  This should apply to award of any subsidies, special cargo allocation 
quotas, or award of contracts for transportation of cargo. 
• The government should consider setting up of a separate ministry for the shipping 
industry for effective coordination of shipping requirements of various 
government agencies and for removing bureaucratic snags, which hamper smooth 
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III. PORTS, SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AND EXPLOITATION 
OF OFFSHORE RESOURCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the importance of ports, the shipbuilding industry, and the 
exploitation of offshore living and non-living resources as elements of maritime power.  
Each of these elements has its own significance for economic growth and national 
security of the country.  Ports provide the link between the land and sea transports and act 
as a hub of economic activity in surrounding regions.  In addition, they provide operating 
bases to naval forces.  The economic viability of shipbuilding industry in the third world 
countries remains debatable, however, its importance in supporting both merchant and 
naval shipping cannot be ruled out.  Optimum exploitation of offshore natural resources 
can contribute substantially to the economic growth and generate employment 
opportunities.  Discovery and exploitation of offshore energy resources are important 
both economically and strategically because they can reduce the reliance on imported 
energy resources.   
Ports are the essential link between the land transport and the sea transport.  They 
not only provide space for loading and discharge of cargoes from the ships and earn 
revenue from the services rendered thereof, they are a catalyst of economic growth and 
hub of major economic activity in a region.    Apart from the economic benefits generated 
by port activities, ports serve a strategic function of providing operating bases for the 
naval forces.  Possession of a large number of bases offers greater flexibility to own and 
friendly naval forces for deployment.  Despite an overwhelming dependence on seaborne 
trade, Pakistan has relied on two co-located ports at Karachi (Port Qasim can for all 
practical purposes be considered as an extension of Karachi port).  The coastline west of 
Karachi remained devoid of a major commercial port complex for almost fifty years.  
However, the present government took the initiative to develop a commercial port at 
Gwadar, which was initially identified as a port site in 1964.  The port is being built with 
Chinese assistance and the first phase would be fully operational by January 2005.  
Emergence of Gwadar port will reduce Pakistan’s dependence on Karachi and generate 
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economic activities in areas that were badly neglected in the past.  In addition, the 
development of Gwadar port will provide Pakistan an opportunity to benefit from the 
trade emanating from the land-locked neighboring states. 
A national shipbuilding industry was regarded as an essential component of 
maritime power.  The capacity to produce the operational units of both economic and 
military power at sea was generally considered a vast financial asset in peace and a 
strategic necessity in war. 72   However, shipbuilding industry has undergone major 
changes.  There had been a rapid progression in size of the ships and other technological 
advancements accompanied by it.  Moreover, shipbuilding has become a highly 
competitive industry and nations that once dominated the world shipbuilding market have 
seen catastrophic decline in their shipbuilding industries.  From 1977 to 1995, the market 
share of European shipbuilders decreased from 41 percent to 17 percent, while the Far 
East shipbuilding industry dominated by Japan and South Korea grew from 46 percent to 
75 percent in the same period.73   
Pakistan had a modest shipbuilding industry, which has degenerated over the last 
couple of decades.  At present, the industry is virtually lying idle and burdening the 
financial resources of the country.  The deteriorating condition of the national merchant 
marine has adversely affected the shipbuilding industry, which has not received any 
shipbuilding order from Pakistan National Shipping Corporation since 1983.  The last big 
ship built at Karachi shipyard was a 17,300 deadweight tons (dwt) vessel for china in 
1992.  The only support that the shipbuilding industry is getting is through some 
construction orders from the Pakistan Navy and limited maintenance jobs from the 
shipping industry.  Despite its economic problems, Pakistan wants to retain this important 
capability because of strategic reasons.  The prospects of its economic revival remain less 
optimistic in the near future.  In the long-term Pakistan must explore the possibility of 
foreign (preferably Chinese) financial and technological assistance for revival of the 
shipbuilding industry. 
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Exploitation of offshore resources, both living and non-living, can have enormous 
economic potential for maritime nations.  Pakistan has an exclusive economic zone of 
240,000 square kilometers, which is characterized by distinctive oceanic phenomena, that 
produces rich fisheries, mineral, and hydrocarbon resource. 74   However, the marine 
resources of Pakistan have so far remained unexploited; and concerted efforts for 
oceanographic research are required to assess the real potential present in this region.  
The fishing industry in Pakistan contributes 1 percent of the GDP.75  However, it is not 
very well developed to make the optimum use of available living resources in the EEZ.  
The fishing industry is providing employment opportunities to approximately 800,000 
people along the coasts of Sindh and Balochistan.76  Exploration of non-living offshore 
resources has progressed very slowly.  However, with the announcement of new offshore 
oil and gas exploration policy in 2001, the government has been able to attract some 
foreign investment in this sector.  
 
B. PORTS—ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
1. Ports as Hubs of Economic Activity  
A seaport is a place where each-way exchanges between land and sea transport 
regularly takes place. 77   Over the period of time, ports have undergone significant 
transformation.  The first generation ports only acted as an interface between land and sea 
transport and were considered to operate in isolation from trade activities and had limited 
interaction with surrounding municipalities.  The second-generation ports performed a 
broad range of functions and acted as transport, industrial, and commercial centers. In 
fact ports performed an important and fundamental part of the overall pattern of trade and 
transport.  There was a closer relationship between the ports, their transport and trade 
partners and between ports and surrounding municipalities.  The third generation ports 
are considered to be a product of global containerization.  Ports have become dynamic 
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nodes in the complex international production and distribution network. 78  The four 
principal roles of ports are: 
• Provision of shelter from the elements.  This arises when due to heavy seas and 
storm conditions, ships take shelter in the environs of a port and thereby seek safe 
anchorage. 
• Cargo and passenger handling is the prime function of port, where ships can load 
or discharge their cargoes, and/or passengers. 
• Support services for ships. This includes victualling, stores, bunkering, ship repair 
and so on. 
• A base for industrial development.  This involves the provision of industry and its 
infrastructure to facilitate the development of trade passing through the port. 79  
 
Ports are a great source of revenue generation.  There are three main sources of 
income for a port: dues on ships, dues on goods, and charges for services rendered either 
to ships or to importers and exporters of goods.  The most common basis for port charges 
on ships is net tonnage.  Charges on goods vary according to whether they are imports or 
exports.  Sometimes tariffs on exports are much reduced or they are even exempted to 
stimulate trade.  Charges on goods may also vary according to the length of voyage, and 
according to their value per unit of weight.80  In addition ports stimulate economic 
activity and setup of industrial estates in their proximity.  Ports become part of the supply 
and demand chain of major industries.  On the demand side, ports are sources of raw 
materials for industry; on the supply side the primary processing industries located in and 
around ports are sources for the secondary processing and manufacturing industries.  
Other reasons for the location of industries in and around port areas are that large 
amounts of low value raw material per unit of weight are uneconomic to transport long 
distances over land.81 
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With the push toward globalization and increased containerization of global 
cargo, which is expected to reach 70 percent of the world trade by value in 2010,82 the 
revenue generation potential of ports has far exceeded beyond serving the domestic trade 
of a particular country.  Daniel Y. Coulter argues, “in an era of economic globalization, 
ports are evolving from being traditional interfaces between land and sea to providers of 
complete logistics networks.”83  This is especially true for major hub or transshipment 
ports in the world, which earn huge revenues for host nations.  However, not every port is 
suited to become a hub port.  To qualify, a port must meet certain preconditions such as 
geographical location, ability to handle large ships safely, extent of terminal facilities, 
efficient container handling operations, availability of frequent feeder services with an 
appropriate geographical coverage and attractive cargo-handling charges. In addition, the 
port should have terminal facilities that enable quick turnaround time. 
The growing economic opportunities are definitely not without growing 
challenges for the port planners because ports are subservient to the changes in shipping 
development and not the other way around.  The most obvious impact of shipping 
development upon ports has been the increasing size of merchant vessels.  The shipping 
companies are ordering ships, which are bigger and have larger carrying capacity.  
Today’s mega ships with 6000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) capacity would look 
miniscule in front of the designed 12,000 or 18,000 TEU capacity ships.  Such ships 
would be restricted because of their size to call only on mega ports, which are able to 
handle these ships with minimum turnaround time.  The criteria defined by Coulter for 
such ports require minimum quay length of 330 meters (m), minimum draft of 15m 
without tidal windows, and minimum crane outreach of 48m.84  The ports meeting the 
basic prerequisites would then need to ensure fast turnaround times for these ships to 
avoid the risk of losing the alliances and the many associated feeder connections. For 
ports not selected by the major shipping lines because of insufficient facilities to handle 
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such ships, the choice will then be to either invest heavily in an attempt to gain hub status 
or seek their market serving feeder trades that typically employ ships less than 4,000–
TEU capacity.85 
2. Development of Ports in Pakistan—Economic Opportunities and 
Security Challenges 
a. Existing Port Infrastructure 
Pakistan has about 1046 km long coastline on the Arabian Sea spreading 
from the Indian border to the Persian Gulf. At the time of independence, Pakistan 
inherited only one deep-water functional port at Karachi in the western half of the 
country.  This port not only catered for the entire sea borne cargo of the country but also 
provided transit trade facility to land locked Afghanistan. With the increase in seaborne 
trade, the need was felt for another port to take off some load from the single port at 
Karachi.  The establishment of Pakistan Steel Mill Project in 1970s added additional 
impetus to this need and finally the construction of a second seaport, Muhammad Bin 
Qasim, was started in mid 1970s.  This port was completed and opened to shipping in 
1990 and is in operation ever since.  At present both of these ports serve 803,943 square 
kilometers of hinterland as well as offering services for landlocked Afghanistan. 86 
Karachi port handles about 75 percent of the entire national cargo. It is a 
deep-sea natural port with 11 km long approach channel to provide safe navigation up to 
75,000 deadweight tons (dwt) tankers, modern container vessels, bulk carriers and 
general cargo ships.  The Port has 30 dry cargo berths including two container terminals 
and three liquid cargo-handling berths.  Eighty percent of the country’s container traffic 
is handled at Karachi Port.  There are two dedicated container terminals. Karachi 
International Container Terminal being operated by Hutchison Port Holdings handles 
300,000 TEU containers per annum.  Pakistan International Container Terminal has 
recently being completed with a capacity to handle 350,000 TEU containers per annum.  
This terminal was constructed on build, operate, transfer basis (BOT) under 21 year 
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implementation agreement between the Karachi Port Trust and Premier Mercantile 
Services Private Ltd.87 There are a number of smaller stevedoring companies that handle 
the remaining container traffic.  In addition to providing livelihood to millions of people, 
Karachi Port is a major source of revenue generation.  During the fiscal year 2003-04, 
Karachi Port Trust earned Rs9.270 billion showing an increase of 10 percent over the 
preceding year’s income of Rs8.423 billion.  The net surplus after meeting the 
expenditures was Rs4.258 billion.  Total cargo handled in the same period stood at 27.8 
million tons 27.8 million tons and the number of containers handled at the port increased 
to 824,753.88 
Port Qasim is Pakistan’s first industrial and multi-purpose deep-sea port 
situated 52 kilometers south east of Karachi in Indus delta region.  The port is well 
connected to the hinterland through rail and road links.  Port Qasim handles the 
remaining 25 percent of the total cargo and 20 percent of the container traffic.  The port 
has a dedicated container terminal, Qasim International Container Terminal, which is 
being operated by P&O group of Australia.  In addition the port has a dedicated Iron Ore 
& Coal Berth for exclusive use of Pakistan Steel Mills for handling raw material imports, 
a specialized oil terminal offering state-of-art facilities to tankers up to 80,000 DWT, and 
four Multi purpose berths.89  Other than the government-owned steel mills, there are 
number of major privately owned industrial units being set in the port area.  During the 
period from July 2003 to March 2004, Port Qasim handled a cargo volume of 11.2 
million tons and earned an operating income of Rs1.616 billion.  The net surplus after 
meeting the expenditures was Rs704.2 million.90 
The close proximity of the two ports at Karachi to neighboring India has 
certain strategic implications for Pakistan.  The overwhelming dependence on seaborne 
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trade and the reliance on the two ports situated right next to each other greatly simplify 
the enemy’s problem and complicate the challenges faced by Pakistan’s own naval 
planners, who have to protect over stretched sea lines of communication and thwart 
enemy’s attempt to carry out a blockade.  The successful attacks of the Indian Navy on 
shipping and port installations at Karachi during the 1971 war fully exposed the 
vulnerability of a single port complex.  Realizing the problems posed by a single 
operating base, the Pakistan Navy eventually established another naval base at Ormara in 
the mid 1990s, situated approximately 120 nautical miles west of Karachi.   
The development of these two ports was not able to keep pace with the 
growing trade volume.  While the existing cargo handling capacity of the two ports, 
estimated at 42 million metric tons per annum,91 may be just sufficient to handle the 
present trade volume, 92  it will be overstretched to efficiently handle the projected 
increase in trade volume.  Both the ports are facing congestion due to draft limitation on 
vessels, inadequate berth capacity and shortage of unloading infrastructure and storage in 
the port area.  The restriction on night navigation for large ships at Port Qasim remains a 
continuing problem because of which port operations are limited to daylight only.93  
Because of its geographical location, Pakistan always wanted to attract the trade 
emanating form land-locked Central Asian states and provide access to sea through its 
ports.  Though the political situation in the region has hampered any meaningful progress 
in this respect, yet the existing port infrastructure at Karachi was inadequate to efficiently 
handle additional trade volume generated by these countries. This remains the driving 
force for Pakistan to build a deep-sea port at Gwadar, which is expected to act as a 
transshipment port for these countries via Afghanistan. 
b. Gwadar Port—An Economic Gateway 
Gwadar, a coastal town on Makran coast, is strategically located in close 
proximity to major shipping routes emanating from the Persian Gulf.  The decision to 
build a deep-sea port at Gwadar is the realization of a plan envisaged a couple of decades 
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ago.  The work on Gwadar Port has already started with the Chinese assistance and will 
be completed in two phases.  The first phase, with an estimated cost of $248 million, was 
started in 2002 and is expected to complete in January 2005.94  On completion of the 
Phase-I, the port will be able to handle bulk carriers of up to 30,000 dwt and container 
vessels of 25,000 dwt. 95  The first phase of the port includes construction of three 
multipurpose 602m long berths besides construction of a 4.5 kms long approach channel 
dredged from 11.5m to 12.5m.  The port will also have a turning basin of 450m diameter 
and one 100m service berth.  Related port infrastructure and port handling equipment and 
pilot boats, tugs, survey vessels are also included in the first phase of this project.  The 
second phase of the project will be built at an estimated cost of $600 million and will 
comprise of additional 9 berths.  This phase will be built on build operate own 
(BOO)/build operate transfer (BOT) basis and is expected to take 8-10 years depending 
on the active participation of the private sector.  A number of road and rail network are 
planned to effectively connect the port with the hinterland.  The 700 kms long Makran 
Coastal Highway linking Gwadar with Pasni, Ormara, and Karachi is in advanced stages 
of completion.  Another regional linkage is the Gwadar Ratto-Dero motorway linking it 
with Indus Highway through Turbat, Awaran and Khuzdar.  A rail link is also planned to 
connect Gwadar to Quetta and Zahidan.  The existing runway at Gwadar airport is 
extended to 15,000 ft for operation of wide-bodied jet aircraft. 
The economic opportunities brought about by the development of Gwadar 
Port are twofold.  On the internal front, it would help developing a region that has 
remained neglected ever since independence of the country.  In addition to providing 
additional economic opportunities to the local populace, which is mainly dependent on 
fishing, it would open the region for people across the country.  A number of industrial 
units are planned to be constructed in vicinity of the port and along the coastal highway, 
which would attract investors, create job opportunities, promote tourism, and open new 
avenues for development in the neglected coastal region.  The provincial government has 
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approved a master plan for the development of Gwadar, which envisages development of 
about 18,600 hectares of land for this project.   
Gwadar is already considered by some to replicate the momentous growth 
witnessed by Karachi, which has turned into the metropolis city of 14 million people 
from a population of 50,000 at the time of independence and serves as the economic 
capital of the country.96  Another major benefit to Gwadar city, in particular, and the 
region in general is the development of socio-economic infrastructure.  The government 
plans to construct modern healthcare facilities, schools, desalination plant, and improve 
the transportation sector. 97   Once developed, Gwadar port would also reduce the 
congestion on existing ports at Karachi. 
The most important economic potential is, however, to attract the 
international trade of the Central Asian states in the short term and develop as a major 
transshipment port in the long term.  In 2002 the total value of international trade by 
Afghanistan and the Central Asian states was $34.454 billion ($18.866 billion exports, 
$15.588 billion imports).98  Proximity of Gwadar to the region, which is only 1200 
kilometers from Turkmenistan, makes it one of the most suitable trade outlets to the 
World.  Asian Development Bank has identified Gwadar as a potential port for greater 
economic cooperation in the region and is providing significant assistance for roads and 
related infrastructure for regional connectivity, through two major road projects to link 
Gwadar Port, through the Balochistan and NWFP road networks, to the borders of 
Afghanistan and on to Central Asia.99  The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural 
Gas Project is one such plan, which envisages the construction of a natural gas 
transmission pipeline of about 1,700 kms to transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas 
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annually from the Dauletabad gas fields in southeast Turkmenistan to consumers in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and possibly, India.  The cost of the project is estimated at $3.3 
billion and project implementation will take five years.100  The plan envisages export of 
liquefied natural gas from Gwadar port in future.  Pakistan also wants to attract the trade 
flow from Xinjiang province in western China and has formally offered its port facilities 
to China for trade with Middle East.101  The distance between Xinjiang and Pakistani 
ports is far less than the comparative distance between this region and ports on east coast 
of China.  The existing road infrastructure of Karakoram highway already connects 
Pakistan to Western China.  Improvement in the existing road infrastructure and its 
linkage to Gwadar via Ratodero-Khuzdar road shall make it the shortest and most viable 
route providing sea access to Western China. 
Development of Gwadar as a major transshipment port in the region can 
have a very significant impact on the economic growth of the country.  The strategic 
location of Gwadar on the entrance of Persian Gulf, huge trade flow from the region, and 
the ever-present political volatility within the Persian Gulf; all favor the development of a 
major transshipment port at Gwadar.  Once developed as a major transshipment port, 
Gwadar can turn around the economic outlook of the country.  After the completion of 
second phase, Gwadar Port will be able to accommodate fourth generation container 
ships drawing 15.6 to 20 meters.  Such development, however, is not without its 
challenges.  The biggest challenge is the financial resources needed to make it a reality.  
Private sector investment is perhaps the most viable option, which is being pursued by 
the government of Pakistan.  Yet another challenge is the inter-port competition offered 
by other major ports in Iran and other Gulf states, which would understandably not like to 
part with their share of transshipment trade.   
c. Ports and National Security 
Ports play an important role in the national security of the country by 
providing operating bases to its naval forces.  The greater the number of bases, the 
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greater is the flexibility of naval forces to operate during peacetime and war.  Reliance on 
single base, as was the case in Pakistan, limits own flexibility and simplifies enemy’s 
problem.  According to Velo: 
The possession of large numbers of bases offers significant advantages for 
deployment, maneuver, and redeployment of one’s own fleet forces and 
the use of the most suitable bases for deployment and redeployment.  It is 
invariably a bad thing to rely on the use of a single major base in wartime, 
because then one’s own forces use the same line of operation for both 
attack and retreat. This in turns resolves the enemy’s problem in the timely 
monitoring of the movements of one’s own and friendly forces.  The 
enemy can with relative ease operate against a fleet that uses a single 
major naval base in a given area of operations.102 
  
The successful Indian Navy attack on naval and merchant shipping and 
port installations at Karachi during the war in 1971 bears testimony to this fact.  
Development of ports and naval bases west of Karachi has two strategic advantages vis-
à-vis national security of the country.  First, it provides added flexibility to the Pakistan 
Navy to operate from three different locations--Karachi, Ormara, and Gwadar.  Second, it 
reduces the dependence on the two ports at Karachi situated closed to India.    
d. Challenges 
There are certain security challenges vis-à-vis the development of Gwadar 
Port, which needs to be addressed by the government at the earliest.  The nationalist 
political elements in Balochistan are not very receptive of the ongoing economic changes 
and influx of people from other parts of the country.  The resentment of the local 
populace and the political leadership is primarily because of the fear that most of the job 
opportunities would be taken up by people moving in from other parts of the country and 
the project itself will have limited or no effect on their socio-economic condition.  
Moreover, they also fear that a huge influx of people would create a demographic 
imbalance and make them a minority in their own hometown.   
The nationalist parties have criticized the manner in which jobs are 
allegedly being outsourced to non-locals.  In the past this resentment has led into violence 
leading to the death of three Chinese engineers in a series of explosions on 3 May 2004.  
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The most recent incident was two bomb explosions in the month of September 2004.  The 
possibility of external involvement by anti-Pakistan forces cannot be totally ruled out.  
The Chief Minister of Balochistan has hinted at the involvement of Indian intelligence 
agencies in masterminding and financing political violence in the province.  He alleged 
that “conspiracies are hatched against Balochistan by anti-Pakistan forces who do not 
want Gwadar port to become [an] economic hub in the region.”103  Understandably there 
cannot be any meaningful private investment if the internal security situation is not 
improved.  The long-term solution is to give due consideration to the genuine concerns of 
locals and integrate the nationalist political parties in moving ahead with the development 
of Gwadar Port.  Formation of a parliamentary panel to resolve the issue is a right step in 
this direction.104 
 
C. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY IN PAKISTAN—AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
1. Trend in Global Shipbuilding Industry 
The domestic shipbuilding industry was once considered vital for its role in 
sustaining national merchant marine and the navy of a maritime nation.  However, there 
has been a radical shift in the shipbuilding industry and a number of maritime nations 
have accepted “…dependence they would have never countenanced…, [which] is 
sometimes accompanied by catastrophic declines in their own shipbuilding industries.”105  
For example, though the U.S. shipbuilding industry designs and builds the most advanced 
military vessels in the world, yet it is not competitive in construction of large commercial 
ships and its share in the global shipbuilding market is less than 2 percent.106  The market 
share in shipbuilding industry of the Great Britain declined from 55 percent at the 
beginning of the twentieth century to just 1 percent in 1995.107  The case of other 
European shipbuilding countries is more or less the same and together they accounted for 
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17 percent of the total production in 1995 as against 41 percent in 1977.108  The Far 
Eastern countries of Japan and South Korea are the two dominant players accounting for 
more than two-third of total shipbuilding activity in the world.  China is yet another 
country, which has gradually increased its share in the shipbuilding market to 7 percent 
and is world’s third largest shipbuilder in terms of gross tonnage.109 
2. Decline of Shipbuilding Industry in Pakistan 
The case of Pakistan’s shipbuilding industry is somewhat similar to the declining 
trend witnessed elsewhere in the world.  Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works 
(KSEW), the oldest heavy engineering works in the country, was established in 1957.  It 
is a government owned organization and is fully equipped for shipbuilding, ship repairing 
and heavy/general engineering works.  Karachi Shipyard has built over 400 vessels of 
various types and sizes not only for the country but also for many other nations in the 
region.  It is fully equipped to build passenger and cargo ships, oil tankers, and bulk 
carriers of up to 26,000 dwt.  In addition to ship construction, Karachi Shipyard has 
repaired over 4000 vessels, half of which were foreign flagships.110   However, the 
industry is virtually lying idle for more than a decade now in absence of any shipbuilding 
order.  The last commercial ship built at the yard was a 17,300 dwt vessel for China in 
1992.   
One of the major reasons for this decline is the collapse of domestic shipping 
industry, which is supposedly linked to the shipbuilding and repair activities.  The only 
thing, which is keeping the industry alive, is the continued support from the Pakistan 
Navy.  KSEW has been a partner in the construction mine counter measure vessel 
(MCMV), fast patrol boat, missile craft, floating docks and tugs for the Pakistan Navy.  
In absence of its core activity, the shipyard has diverted its attention to general 
engineering works and has undertaken a variety of engineering and structural works for 
oil refineries, storage installations and oil based industries as well as engineering 
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workshops, and cement and sugar factories.  However, such activities and limited support 
from the navy has not been able to make the industry financially viable.  At present the 
industry is grossly underperforming and overburdening national resources for its 
continued existence.  It was reported in September 2004 that organization had not been 
able to pay salaries to its employees for the last four months and a grant of Rs400 million 
was requested from the Ministry of Finance to pay the overdue salaries.111  In 2002 the 
government approved the plan for privatization of Karachi shipyard, 112  which was 
subsequently shelved due to security reasons.  The most recent development is the 
decision of the government to hand over the control of KSEW to the Pakistan Navy with 
the direction to steer the industry out of financial crisis.113 
3. Why Pakistan Needs the Shipbuilding Industry? 
Given the fact that shipbuilding industry in Pakistan has become financially 
unviable and unable to sustain itself, the question arises why should it be kept afloat 
when it is extremely difficult if not impossible for the industry to become competitive 
with its existing infrastructure?  Even if it the industry is revived with massive 
investment, it is difficult to visualize how it would sustain itself in the longer run 
especially when there are no signs of immediate turnaround in the domestic shipping 
industry.  Moreover, in its entire history, the decade of 1970s was the only time when the 
organization made a profit mainly because of foreign shipbuilding orders.114  To compete 
in the global market, continued facility modernization and improved labor force 
productivity are required.  Moreover the shipbuilding industry is dependent on 
experienced and skilled workers whose expertise has been developed over long periods 
and they need continued on job training to practice and improve their skills.115  Lack of 
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productivity has impeded modernization of existing infrastructure at KSEW and severely 
depleted the skilled labor.  Economic revival of the industry to become competitive 
regionally and/or globally is therefore not realistic—at least in the short term.   
The only other reason why Pakistan should maintain the existing infrastructure is 
purely strategic.  Shipbuilding industry is a strategic asset for Pakistan despite its 
financial difficulties.  If the existing capability is totally lost today, it would be extremely 
difficult to resurrect it in future.  The industry is crucial to support the efforts of the 
Pakistan Navy to indigenously build various types of warships and submarines with joint 
collaboration of foreign countries.  The joint collaboration of Karachi shipyard and the 
Pakistan Navy in construction of MCMV, fast patrol boats, and missile crafts is a 
significant step forward in achieving some degree of self reliance in production of 
military ships.  Karachi Shipyard has also contributed in the construction of Agosta 90B 
submarines, two of which have been built in Pakistan with French assistance.  The 
proposed construction of the Chinese F-22P frigates at Karachi Shipyard not only would 
provide the much needed financial relief to the industry, it would also provide the 
technical knowledge for construction of larger warships.116  The most important aspect in 
this regard is to maintain some sort of production continuity to maintain and improve the 
country’s technical skills.   
4. Strategy for Revival 
The immediate concern of the shipbuilding industry is to receive work orders 
related to shipbuilding or ship repair activity and the protection of government in getting 
the job orders from public enterprises, which have started giving preference to foreign 
yards for their maintenance needs. 117   Government subsidies and protection in 
shipbuilding industry are instrumental in survival of the industry all over the world.  For 
example, the Jones Act requires that all vessels operating between U.S. ports be U.S. 
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owned, U.S. operated, and U.S. built.118  South Korea is alleged to have unfavorably 
subsidized its shipbuilding industry, which has become a contentious issue between the 
European Union and South Korea.119  In the short term the government must ensure 
through some legislative action that state run maritime organizations like the Pakistan 
National Shipping Corporation, Karachi Port Trust, Port Qasim accord priority in giving 
all repair orders to the Karachi shipyard, which can efficiently be undertaken by the 
organization.  Similarly orders for construction of new ships and other auxiliary crafts 
should be given to the domestic industry.  Pakistan Navy must continue its role in 
supporting the industry and undertaking joint projects for construction of naval vessels in 
addition to its repair and maintenance needs. 
The government does not favor privatization of the shipbuilding industry in 
Pakistan.  However, the long-term revival of the shipbuilding industry and its economic 
viability is very difficult in absence of foreign technical and economic assistance.  
Cooperation with China, which is emerging as a major shipbuilding industry in the world, 
appears to be the most suitable course of action.  The existing facilities may be offered to 
China for joint collaboration in the field of shipbuilding and ship repair.  It may be done 
in a fashion similar to what Brazil did to emerge as a major shipbuilder.  The Brazilian 
government struck a bargain with foreign shipbuilders and provided them a base replete 
with low costs, while the investors provided capital and technology.120  The government 
should provide a base with low labor costs, and a protected domestic market.  The 
industry may be jointly managed by the officials from two countries to ensure optimum 
efficiency.  China can use the existing facilities to build smaller vessels up to 26,000 dwt 
needed to serve intra-regional trade and feeder container markets.  If the proposed 
cooperation successfully takes off, then the existing facilities may be upgraded in future 
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to undertake construction of larger ships and establishment of another shipyard at Gwadar 
Port may be considered for improved productivity.   
 
D. EXPLOITATION OF OFFSHORE NATURAL RESOURCES 
Increased human use and rise in population all over the world continue to put 
additional pressure on existing resources and the struggle for the search of new resources 
remains an unending process.  The problem of resource constraints is more pronounced 
for third world countries like Pakistan, where the strain on resources grows much more 
rapidly because of the unchecked population growth.  Sea provides alternate medium for 
extraction of resources and has always played a significant role in sustaining human life.  
Exploitable resources from the sea are divided into living and non-living, or renewable 
and non-renewable resources.  Both living and non-living resources can, in certain cases, 
enormously add to a state’s economic power.  Offshore fishing is a centuries old 
profession, which contributes largely to domestic economies and foreign exports of many 
coastal states.  The exploitation of non-living resources is somewhat recent phenomenon 
but has made significant contributions to the economic power of many states. Oil and gas 
extractions remain the clearest examples of offshore exploitation of resources.  More than 
a quarter of the entire world’s oil comes from undersea installations.121  Exploitation of 
non-living resources is not restricted to oil and gas but efforts have been made to extract a 
number of other minerals buried in the seabed.  
Pakistan has an EEZ of approximately 240,000 square kilometers, the exact 
potential of which in terms of natural resources remains largely unknown because of 
inadequate scientific research.  National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) was established 
in 1981 by the Ministry of Science and Technology to carry out research related to 
diverse fields of oceanic studies.  The institute has limited resources to carry out 
extensive research that is required to optimally explore the natural resources in the EEZ.  
There is no dedicated oceanographic research vessel with the institute; however, it has 
access to the hydrographic cum oceanographic research vessel Behr Paima, which is 
mainly employed to carry out hydrographic research in the coastal areas.  NIO has 
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conducted and completed a number of projects related to ocean research for marine 
industry and national institutions and maintains effective collaboration with international 
oceanographic organizations.122  At present the exploitation of offshore natural resources 
in Pakistan is restricted to marine fisheries, which is an important economic activity in 
the coastal region. 
1. Exploitation of Living Resources 
Marine Fisheries industry contributes 1 percent of the GDP and is considered as 
one of the most important economic activity along the coastline of Sindh and Balochistan 
where the poorest communities of fishermen live.  According to an estimate, the marine 
fisheries industry provides direct employment to 370,000 people and another 400,000 are 
employed in ancillary industries.123  During the period July 2003 to March 2004, 101256 
tons of fish and fishery products, valued at Rs7.9 billion, were exported to Japan, USA, 
UK, Germany, Middle East, Sri Lanka, and China.  During the same period, the total fish 
production was estimated at 630,000 tons with 452,000 tons contributed by the marine 
sector.124  Pakistan is exporting fish and fishery products in raw form i.e., either frozen, 
chilled, or dried.  The margin of profit for value-added products as against raw exports is 
considerably more and this is identified as a potential area to make the fisheries sector 
more productive.125  
Pakistan’s EEZ largely remains unexploited because of inadequate fishing fleet 
and absence of detailed surveys to understand exact magnitude of the fishery resources.   
The activities of local fishermen are mostly confined within the territorial waters because 
their boats are not equipped with navigation facilities, electronic fish finding equipment, 
mechanical retrieval devices, and adequate storage facilities.  According to Marine 
Fisheries Department of Pakistan, there are only 15 fishing vessels operating beyond 
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territorial waters in a zone extending from 12 to 35 nautical miles offshore and there are 
none operating beyond 35 nautical miles. 126   This limitation of fishing fleet amply 
explains the extent of unexploited potential within the EEZ.  In 2001, the government 
announced a revised deep sea fishing policy with two broad aims:127   
• To enhance the foreign exchange earnings through an increased export of fish 
and fishery products by exploiting the untapped fishery resources of the area 
beyond territorial waters by allowing deep-sea trawlers by paying prescribed fee.  
• To uplift the socio-economic condition of the small-scale fishermen by 
providing them boats with modern gadgets, upgrading their knowledge/skills 
through training, and ensuring better prices for their harvest through improved 
handling, preservation and marketing system.  
2. Exploitation of Non-Living Resources 
Exploitation of non-living energy and mineral resources from the sea is the most 
promising aspect with respect to its economic potentials.  It is also important because of 
the fact that Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign energy resources and considerable 
amount of foreign exchange is spent each year to meet the energy requirements.  During 
the period from July 2003 to April 2004, petroleum products worth $2.48 billion were 
imported.  Moreover, the annual energy consumption has registered an estimated increase 
of 4.1 percent in the last thirteen years from 1990-91 to 2002-03. 128   However, 
exploitation of resources has to be preceded by the exploration of these resources, which 
remains very challenging because of its capital-intensive nature and the technology 
needed to undertake such projects.  For a developing country like Pakistan, the only 
viable option remains the investment by private sector to undertake exploration and 
exploitation of these resources.  Despite its enormous economic potential, offshore 
exploration of energy resources has progressed very slowly in Pakistan.  There were few 
attempts in the past to explore offshore areas in the Indus delta and the Makran coastal 
region, which established the presence of hydrocarbon resources in these areas.  
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Commercial extraction was, however, not undertaken from these wells because it was 
considered uneconomical.129 
In 2001, the government of Pakistan announced a new offshore exploration 
policy, which is considered investor friendly and has since been able to attract some 
investment in this sector.130  The policy offers a package of incentives for offshore 
exploration of oil and gas that allows the investors to recover their initial costs and 
subsequently share the revenues with government.  Moreover, to promote the exploration 
in ultra deep water, the offshore areas were divided into three zones; shallow, deep and 
ultra-deep, for which different profit rates on oil/gas split were offered.  In December 
2003, a consortium led by Shell Development and Offshore Pakistan, a subsidiary of 
Anglo-Dutch Shell Group, started exploring oil and gas in the Indus delta region.  
Another offshore drilling contract was awarded to multilateral consortiums led by Shell 
and French Total.  The Total-led consortium, which also includes Malaysia's Petronas 
and Austria's OMV, is expected to invest $30 to $40 million in drilling its ultra deep well 
located some 300 km from Karachi.  Pakistan signed another offshore oil exploration deal 
with Total in July 2003 that could bring the investment up to $3 billion if a significant 
discovery is found.  The state-run, Pakistan Petroleum Ltd, was awarded 8,500 square 
kilometers block along the coastline of Balochistan for exploration in this area.131   
3. Challenges  
There are two major challenges with respect to offshore exploitation of natural 
resources.  First, the environmental degradation of the sea is a great concern in Pakistan 
and it is severely affecting the marine life in coastal areas, especially around Karachi.  
Pakistan has mangroves forests spread over 800,000 acres of swamp.  These forests are 
essential life supporting ecosystem providing habitat, shelter and breeding ground for a 
number of economically important marine species.  Exploitation of these forests and has 
put the marine and coastal ecosystems in Pakistan are under a great deal of stress.  The 
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coast is exposed to negative environmental impacts from thermal pollution, increased oil 
spills, tar balls, and plastic and toxic effluents, including heavy metal.  Karachi Port itself 
is mostly polluted by non-port-related activities.  An estimated 90,000 tons of oil 
products from vessels and the port's terminals are dumped every year in the port's 
water.132  Moreover 300 million gallons of untreated industrial and municipal waste is 
thrown into the Arabian Sea every day.  All these factors are contributing towards the 
loss of important species of mangrove forests and marine animals, such as marine turtle.  
The port authorities are ill equipped to deal with a major ecological disaster.  In July 
2003 an oil tanker, Tasman Spirit, carrying a load of about 67,500 tons of crude ran 
aground in Karachi Port.  The ship eventually broke up and released over 32,000 tons of 
crude oil in the sea, which has badly affected the marine life already exposed to coastal 
pollution.  According to an estimate, cleansing of ecosystem from the adverse effects of 
oil spill will take at least five years.133   
Second, in order to benefit from the Article 76 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS),134 which establishes the right of a coastal state to 
extend its claim beyond 200 nm EEZ if there is a natural prolongation of the coastal 
state's landmass outside of that distance, Pakistan has a lot of work to do before 
submitting its claim.  The absolute deadline for submitting the claims is 13 May 2009 i.e., 
10 years after the date of adoption of the Scientific and Technical Guidelines laid down 
by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).135  Coastal states who 
consider that they should claim shelf beyond 200 nautical miles need to prepare a robust 
case with supporting scientific and technical data, which will be evaluated by the 
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CLCS. 136   Preparation of such data is a complex, expensive, and time consuming 
undertaking, which is explained in detail by the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of 
the CLCS.137  Since the potential loss of resource by a coastal state if it was to fail to 
claim is continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is huge, Pakistan must expedite its 
efforts in gathering the scientific and technical data and submitting its claim to the CLCS 
before it is too late. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The relevance of ports, the shipbuilding industry, and the exploitation of offshore 
natural resources as elements of the maritime power is discussed in this chapter.  Ports 
not only provide a link between the land and the sea transport, they are a great catalyst for 
generating economic activity in the region surrounding it.  With the increase in 
containerization, some ports of the world have assumed an even important role of serving 
the global trade and have become a great source of revenue for the host countries.  
Pakistan has relied on the two co-located ports at Karachi.  Considering Pakistan’s 
growing dependence on seaborne trade and the historical animosity with India, total 
reliance on ports situated in close proximity to India is strategically disadvantageous.  
The coastline west of Karachi was not exploited till very late.  There is, however, a shift 
in the thinking of government, which has embarked upon an ambitious program of 
developing Gwadar as deep-sea port.  The emergence of Gwadar as a deep-sea port has 
tremendous economic potentials.  The port is envisioned to serve as a conduit for the 
trade of land-locked states of Central Asia and at some stage develop as a major 
transshipment port to serve the global seaborne trade in the region.  Gwadar would also 
provide a strategically important base to the Pakistan Navy west of Karachi.  The success 
and development of Gwadar as a major commercial port is not without its challenges.  
The most important challenge is the internal security situation in the region and the 
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concerns of the nationalist parties in Balochistan.  It is extremely important for the 
government to find a mutually accepted and long lasting solution to the problem and 
provide a secure environment for private investment, which is crucial for development of 
the port. 
Shipbuilding industry in Pakistan is has not been able to operate profitably except 
for a brief period in the 1970s.  Lack of work has rendered the industry virtually idle 
except for the little support that it receives from the Pakistan Navy.  Despite all its 
economic difficulties, shipbuilding industry remains a strategic asset, which Pakistan 
cannot afford to lose.  Sustenance of shipbuilding is necessary to support indigenous ship 
construction efforts of the Pakistan Navy.  For the industry to become financially viable 
in the long term, the government must look for foreign investment preferably from China, 
which is emerging as a major shipbuilder in the world. 
Exploitation of offshore natural resources in Pakistan is progressing very slowly.  
The country has a vast exclusive economic zone, which is potentially rich in both living 
and non-living resources.  However, in absence of scientific data and adequate 
oceanographic research, true extent of these resources is not known.  Exploitation of 
living resources is mainly limited to marine fisheries, which is the biggest source of 
employment in the coastal region.  The contribution of marine fisheries in the national 
economy has extensive potential to improve if Pakistan concentrates on exporting value 
added products as against raw fish and other fishery products.  The existing fishing fleet 
of Pakistani fishermen needs to be modernized for better exploitation and preservation of 
living resources in the EEZ.  Exploration of offshore energy resources has gained some 
momentum in the recent years because of attractive policies promulgated by the 
government.  However, the results of these activities are known as yet.  Two major 
challenges in this regard are the high level of marine pollution, which is damaging the 
offshore living resources and the limited time available for preparation of scientific data 
for claiming the continental shelf beyond the EEZ.  Following recommendations are 
made with respect to development of ports, shipbuilding industry and exploitation of 
offshore resources in Pakistan: 
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• The government must address the security related issues in Gwadar and reach a 
negotiated solution with the nationalist elements in Balochistan taking due 
cognizance of their grievances.  It is important for envisaged future investment by 
the private sector. 
• The government must explore the possibility of joint collaboration with China for 
economic revival of domestic shipbuilding industry.   
• The problem of marine pollution is seriously degrading the living resources and 
needs immediate attention.  The government must devote more efforts to control 
and drastically reduce the damage being done by unchecked pollution. 
• In order to submit its claim for continental shelf beyond the EEZ, the government 
must accelerate its effort to gather the scientific and technical data necessary for 


























IV. PAKISTAN NAVY—MILITARY POWER AT SEA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Military power at sea is perhaps the most important component of a maritime 
power.  While the international law of the sea provides for equal access to trade and 
resources to maritime nations, offering a multitude of benefits in economic terms; they 
nonetheless remain vulnerable to coercive pressure and simple predation.138  The means 
to defend against such interdiction and the protection of economic elements of maritime 
power ultimately lie in the possession of an effective navy.139  It can be argued that both 
economic and military elements of maritime power are not only interrelated, they are in 
fact interdependent.  The quest for accruing economic benefits from the sea is a 
motivation for the development of the military power at sea, which in turn facilitates the 
growth and expansion of the maritime economic elements.  This is aptly explained by a 
quote from Lord Haversham about the British case: 
Your fleet and your trade have so near a relation and such mutual 
influence on each other, they cannot well be separated, your trade is the 
mother and nurse of your seamen, your seamen are the life of the fleet and 
your fleet is the security and protection of your trade.140 
Apart from protection of seaborne trade and resources, navies around the world 
serve strategic interests of the maritime nations i.e., the assertion of sovereignty in one’s 
own territorial waters and to safeguard the security of state against any threat emanating 
from the sea.  The existence of military power at sea is more relevant today than it was in 
the past considering the monumental growth of seaborne trade and its impact on 
economic development.  All great maritime powers have either developed naval forces to 
protect their maritime assets or have been eclipsed by adversaries who either threaten 
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their access to land-based resources and trade or challenge their commercial activity at 
sea by interfering with their rights of navigation.141   
A maritime nation may have an identifiable continental or maritime inclination in 
its strategic orientation and culture because of its physical and political geography.142  
However, all maritime nations have certain maritime interests.  The definition and scope 
of these interests for different countries varies depending upon a variety of factors.  They 
can, however, broadly be categorized as strategic, and maritime interests.  Strategic 
interests are related to protecting the security of the state, which has different connotation 
both in peacetime and during war.  Maritime interests encompass all activities related to 
shipping, freedom of navigation, and the enforcement of the law of sea.  It also includes 
resource-based interests, which are focused on exploitation of offshore resources within 
the EEZ.  No matter what the strategic orientation of a maritime nation is, it needs an 
effective military power at sea to safeguard and promote its maritime interests.  In fact 
both continental and maritime strategies are complimentary to each other and cannot 
work in isolation because neither sea power nor land power can be considered separately 
as instrument of decision in war.143  Historically great sea powers have required a land 
power dimension to their strategy, and great land powers typically have discovered that 
without a strong navy, a sea-based enemy could menace their gains on land.144  Napoleon 
may well have been beaten at Waterloo and not at Trafalgar, but it was after the defeat at 
Trafalgar that the Napoleonic hegemony crumbled and the British sea power gradually 
strangled ‘Fortress Europe.’145 
Pakistan has significant economic and strategic maritime interests.  However, 
development of the Pakistan Navy as an element of military power has not been 
proportionate with the growth of country’s maritime interests.  This is primarily because 
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of continental orientation of the policy makers, who have failed to recognize a suitable 
role of the navy in overall military strategy of the country.  This weakness of the navy 
presents grave vulnerabilities considering Pakistan’s overwhelming dependence on 
seaborne trade and its continued rivalry with neighboring India.  In this chapter I discuss 
the Pakistan Navy as an element of maritime strategy in Pakistan.   
Since the need for a navy is driven by maritime interests of a nation, it is 
important to understand why Pakistan needs a navy and whether the size and shape of the 
Pakistan Navy are commensurate with the interests.  Though there are a number of 
factors, which have affected the development of the Pakistan Navy in varying degrees, 
yet the most important factor remains the continental mindset of the ruling elite and the 
overbearing influence of the Pakistan Army in framing strategic perceptions of the 
country.  In this chapter I argue that development of the Pakistan Navy is more important 
now than it has been ever before and Pakistan cannot afford to neglect it in future.  This 
argument is built on two hypotheses.  First, limited conventional war at sea between India 
and Pakistan is more not less likely in a future conflict.  Overwhelming conventional 
superiority of the Indian Navy poses serious challenges in case of such an eventuality.  
Second, the acquisition of sea-based second-strike capability by India, which it is 
aggressively pursuing, would disturb the strategic balance in the region and may result in 
failure of nuclear deterrence.  Pakistan must acquire a sea-based second-strike capability 
to maintain strategic balance in the region.  There are, however, a number of challenges 
for the development of the navy, the most important of which would require the 
redistribution of allocated military resources.  In the greater national interest the 
policymakers in Pakistan will have to abandon their continental biases in order to make 
the Pakistan Navy as an effective tool of military strategy.  
 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Pakistan’s Maritime Interests—The raison d’être of Pakistan Navy 
The strategic value of naval power cannot be derived from the isolated study of 
ships, navies, or sea power because naval power is valuable only if a country needs it.146 
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The size and power of the navy of a country has to commensurate with its maritime 
interests.  In order to understand the raison d’être of the Pakistan Navy, it would be 
appropriate to analyze the maritime interests of the country.   
a. Strategic Interests 
External military threat and security perceptions for Pakistan come solely 
from India and nowhere else.147 Ever since it gained independence in 1947, Pakistan has 
continuously lived in an atmosphere of bitter animosity with neighboring India.  There 
have been a number of armed conflicts between the two rivals in the past, one of which 
saw the dismemberment of the eastern wing of the country in 1971, now Bangladesh.  
Despite the fact that both countries demonstrated overt nuclear capability in 1998, 
nuclear deterrence has not precluded the possibility of armed conflict.  In fact, South Asia 
is the only region in the world where active armed conflicts occur under the shadow of 
nuclear weapons.148 The region has witnessed a limited war in Kargil between India and 
Pakistan in 1999 followed by a prolonged and dangerous military standoff in 2001-02.  
These crises have demonstrated that even the presence of nuclear weapons might not 
appreciably dampen security competition between India and Pakistan and recurrence of 
such events in future cannot be ruled out since major issues between the two countries are 
still unresolved. 
The growing conventional military imbalance between the two countries 
has serious consequences and it may jeopardize the nuclear deterrence to work at its best.  
This is more so in case of the two navies where the conventional balance tilts heavily 
towards India.  Whatever qualitative edge Pakistan Navy enjoyed in the past has eroded 
mainly because of its stagnated development since early 1990s owing to the US sanctions 
and the slump in the economic growth.  During the same period, the Indian Navy has 
grown rapidly both in terms of quality and quantity as a result of sustained economic 
growth and the consequent increase in defense spending.  The reasons for Indian naval 
modernization are clear enough.  India has always aspired to become a maritime power in 
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the region because of its regional hegemonic designs.  India is dependent on sea for its 
international trade and offshore living and non-living resources.  With its economy 
becoming more stable and the increase in demand of resources due growing population, 
India will move towards a significant naval presence.149   Secondly, and even more 
importantly is the fact that India is progressing fast to achieve a sea-based second-strike 
capability, ostensibly to pursue an independent foreign policy posture,150  which can 
nonetheless have a destabilizing effect on the strategic balance in the absence of similar 
capability with Pakistan. 
In short, the future development of the Pakistan Navy needs to be viewed 
from two strategic angles.  Considering the hypothesis that a limited conventional war in 
future between India and Pakistan cannot be totally ruled out, an overwhelming 
conventional imbalance between the two navies can be a highly destabilizing factor.  For 
conventionally weaker side, Pakistan, it reduces ability of the country to absorb a 
conventional shock and may thus result in lowering the nuclear threshold.  That is to say 
that a conventionally weaker side would reach the nuclear threshold sooner than its 
adversary.  This can have serious implications for the country with respect to its decision-
making ability to deploy nuclear weapons.  For example, despite its conventional 
inferiority and the security challenges that it may face in any future conflict, how would 
the international community view Pakistan’s decision to deploy nuclear weapons at an 
early stage of the conflict?   
Secondly, a nuclear force capable of fulfilling the deterrence functions 
assigned to it without undue risks must be able to survive a first strike designed to 
prevent the force from striking back.  At present both India and Pakistan do not possess 
credible second-strike capability, which is capable of surviving a first strike.  This in 
itself is a destabilizing factor because it invites preemption in face of imminent perceived 
threat.  The problem further compounds considering Indian efforts to acquire a sea-based 
second strike capability.  Absence of a similar capability with Pakistan may make 
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preemption more likely leaving Pakistan with the only option to acquire a sea-based 
second-strike capability in order to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence.   
b. Economic Interests 
Economic interests can be broadly divided into two categories: trade and 
access, and resource based interests.  All maritime countries depend in varying degree for 
their economic well being on overseas trade.  Generally, the importance of maritime trade 
depends on a country’s geographical location and the level of its economic self-
sufficiency. 151   However, integration within the global economy and reliance on 
international trade as the primary engine of economic growth and development are more 
relevant today than ever before.  Sea provides the most cost-effective medium for 
transportation of goods around the globe, which explains why the bulk of international 
trade is routed through sea.  Pakistan, because of its geo-strategic location and the 
prevalent geo-political environment, is heavily dependent on seaborne trade.  More than 
95 percent of country’s trade is transported through sea, which in 2002-2003, 
approximately amounted to 36.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).152  With 
the relative economic stability being witnessed by the country for the last couple of years, 
the share of international trade is expected to increase.  This is evident from the projected 
growth of trade for the year 2004-05 where the export and import targets have been set at 
$13.7 and $16.7 billion respectively.153  The completion of Gwadar deep-sea port in the 
near future is likely to increase the trade volume in coming years.  It would also be 
appropriate to mention here that 45 percent of Pakistan’s energy requirements are met by 
fuel oil.  At present two thirds of the total fuel requirement oil is imported from the Gulf 
region, and with the projected consumption rate, Pakistan is likely to become one of the 
largest importers of fuel oil in the Asia-Pacific region by 2005.154 
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Attack on maritime trade in general has always been a considerable 
feature of any war at sea and is usually highly effective against an island nation, but less 
so against a continental country with well-developed land communications with its 
neighboring countries.155 Over land Pakistan has limited options due to its geographic 
location and geopolitical situation in neighboring countries.  Sea remains the only viable 
mean for trade.  Disruption of seaborne trade in case of a future conflict with India, which 
is an explicit operation, envisaged by the Indian Navy,156 can adversely affect the fragile 
economy of Pakistan.  Though economic strangulation of Pakistan by India has been 
defined as one of the thresholds that would (or could) lead to Pakistani nuclear 
retaliation,157 yet there is something, which merits careful consideration.  The objectives 
of attack on enemy maritime trade are reduction of the traffic volume, usually expressed 
in percentages.  This is accomplished by ‘interfering’ with or ‘interdicting’ enemy 
maritime trade.158  Because of inherently flexible nature of naval forces, they can be 
deployed at high seas without commitment, to wait and gain time for diplomacy.  They 
can pose a threat and sustain it without a single warlike act and if prospects look poor, 
naval forces are easier to withdraw.159 Short of outright interdiction of maritime trade, an 
offensive posture by the Indian Navy at sea can interfere with Pakistan’s seaborne trade 
either by deterring neutral shipping from plying in a war prone zone or unacceptably 
increasing freight rates and insurance charges.  In absence of a well-developed merchant 
marine under national flag, which in case of Pakistan carries only 5 percent of the total 
trade volume,160 such a situation poses serious challenges.  It can badly hurt the economy 
while resting the onus of changing the status quo squarely on Pakistan.          
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Resource based interests form the other main category of maritime 
economic interests.  Pakistan has an EEZ of 240,000 square kilometers, which is rich in 
food and mineral resources.  In addition Pakistan can lay claim on the continental shelf 
and thus bring another 60,000 square kilometers of sea area under its jurisdiction.  There 
is however, an outstanding boundary dispute between India and Pakistan in the Sir Creek 
area, which is the most fish fertile area of the region.  Sir Creek, one of the distributaries 
of River Indus, is a 60-mile-long strip of water between the Rann of Kutch (India) and 
Sindh (Pakistan), which emerged as a disputed area in late 1960s.  A number of 
inconclusive attempts have since been made to find a solution to this conflict, the latest 
being made on 5-6 August 2004.  Though both the countries have reiterated the need for 
an early resolution of the conflict; none is apparently ready to make concessions from its 
stated position.  Pakistan has, however, taken a step further by proposing to take the 
matter to an international tribunal for settlement.161   
Exploitation of sea-based resources in the EEZ was not accorded the 
priority that it deserved in the past.  However, a new offshore oil and gas exploration 
policy was announced by the government in 2001, 162 which is considered investment 
friendly and has been successful in attracting some foreign investment.  A couple of 
offshore drilling contracts have already been awarded to multilateral consortiums and 
some exploration activities in the Indus Delta have commenced in December 2003.163  
The fishing industry in Pakistan, though not very well developed, is a modest source of 
foreign exchange earning.  In addition it provides employment opportunities to few 
hundred thousand workers in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan.   
The economic resources in the EEZ can for all practical purposes be 
considered as an extension of land based resources and merit similar security 
considerations from predation and exploitation by others.  The greater the interests of a 
nation in the EEZ, the higher would be the requirement to provide security against 
external threats.   
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2. Evolution of the Pakistan Navy 
a. The Early Years 
The Pakistan Navy has been the most neglected of the three armed 
services.164  It has witnessed a troubled history since its foundation in 1947.  At the time 
of independence, Pakistan Navy inherited a modest share of two sloops, two frigates, and 
four ocean minesweepers.  The ship repair and maintenance facilities were concentrated 
in Indian ports of Bombay and Calcutta.  There was no facility for naval stores and 
armaments supply and above all there was an acute shortage of officers in every branch 
of the navy.  Rear Admiral Jefford, the first C-in-C of the Royal Pakistan Navy, made 
this remark after reviewing the overall situation, “We have the ships and the men, the rest 
we must create.”165   Despite the fact that Pakistan Navy encountered the perennial 
problems suffered by third world navies operating from inadequate bases of financial, 
technological and personnel resources with the presence of an overweening threat 
enjoying advantages of geography and scale,166 it has come a long way in transforming 
itself to a three-dimensional combat force.  One of the major obstacles that the Navy 
confronted vis-à-vis its smooth development after independence was institutional.  The 
Army in Pakistan was the dominant service in size and influence to such an extent that all 
defense problems were treated from a wholly Army viewpoint.167 
Lack of a maritime vision in Pakistani policymakers was evident right 
from the outset who could not envisage a defined place for the Pakistan Navy in the 
overall strategic plans for the defense of the country.168  This also helps in explaining 
why the navy’s steady improvements in general capability during early years were not 
matched by the development of any coordinated system of joint service command or 
doctrine.  Creating an understanding about the role of the navy in the defense of the 
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country was one of the biggest challenges faced by the navy ever since its existence. The 
policy makers did not appreciate that the sea provided the only reliable link between the 
two wings of the country otherwise separated by over a thousand miles of hostile 
territory.  Rather than encouraging a joint approach, President Mohammad Ayub Khan 
even attempted to merge the navy and the air force into the army by changing their ranks 
and uniforms to match the latter. 169  
Despite all the challenges that the Pakistan Navy faced in its formative 
years, it was lucky to be led by a competent and visionary leader in the form of Vice 
Admiral H. M. S. Choudri, the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy.  
After assuming the post of C-in-C in 1953, Admiral Choudri exploited all possible 
opportunities for expansion of the navy.  However in the process he was often dismayed 
by the attitude of decision makers in Pakistan, who “sometimes expressed views which 
betrayed, consciously or otherwise, a lack of appreciation of factors which constitute 
Pakistan’s maritime defense.”170  U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement and South 
East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), both signed in 1954, facilitated the relentless 
efforts of Admiral Choudri and the Pakistan Navy saw an era of modest expansion from 
mid to late 1950s.  This transformation, however, did not last very long and differences 
began to surface after the military coup in 1958.  President Mohammad Ayub Khan, 
“who did not appreciate the need for a navy for Pakistan except for local naval defense to 
keep the harbors clear of mines,” was not particularly happy with the expansion of the 
navy in spite of his best efforts to prevent it from happening.171  
The navy’s efforts to acquire submarines from Sweden in late 1950s met 
stiff resistance from the government and at one time President Mohammad Ayub Khan 
refused to sanction a budget sufficient to allow operation of the entire fleet, which had 
been assembled since 1956. 172  The government went as far to issue orders for scrapping 
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the cruiser PNS BABUR, which had only been acquired in 1957, without even consulting 
the Naval Chief.173 Such acute differences eventually forced Admiral H. M. S. Choudri 
to submit his resignation on 26 January 1959, citing his great concern over the effect of 
certain major decisions of the government on the morale and fighting efficiency of the 
navy: 
These decisions concerning the present and the future shape and size of 
the Navy [which] have been taken in disagreement with the technical 
advice I have consistently rendered…in matters concerning the concept of 
our defense, the apportionment of our available defense budget…and the 
size and shape of our Navy etc.  This advice has throughout been based on 
my sincere conviction that the Navy of the size and shape that I was 
pleading for was the right answer to the defense of the country from the 
naval point of view.  I still adhere to that view.174 
b. The 1965 War 
From late 1950s to the period leading up to the 1965 war between Pakistan 
and India, Pakistan Navy made some progress in the acquisition of maritime aircraft and 
submarines.  USS Diablo, a Tench class submarine was transferred to Pakistan under the 
US Aid program and was commissioned as PNS GHAZI on 1 June 1964.  Meanwhile 
successful negotiation took place between Pakistan and France for the purchase of three 
Daphne class submarines.  In 1964, efforts were also made for purchase of six Atlantic 
aircraft, which were not supported by the US Military Aid Group due foreign origin and 
prohibitive cost of the aircraft.175 Pakistan Navy, despite its lack of a well defined place 
in President Ayub Khan’s overall strategic plans for the defense of Pakistan,176 was well 
prepared when the hostilities broke out between Pakistan and India on 6 September 1965.  
However, the naval action during the war was limited to the successful bombardment of 
the radar installations at Dwarka by the Pakistan Navy ships on the night of 7/8 
September 1965.   The  aim  of  this  raid was to draw enemy units out of Bombay for the  
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submarine GHAZI to attack (which was deployed off Bombay), destroy radar 
installations at Dwarka, lower Indian morale, and to divert Indian air effort away from the 
north.177 
c. The 1971 War 
During the intervening period between the two wars, Pakistan Navy 
continued to receive a lower priority, which saw the degeneration of the fleet into a 
shrinking force incapable of providing protection to the sea lines of communication 
between the two wings.  Addition of three Daphne submarines was the only comfort, but 
their limited endurance confined operations only to the Arabian Sea.  Lack of air 
reconnaissance capability proved to be a critical deficiency during the war.  In the 
corresponding period, the Indian Navy underwent rapid expansion and modernization.  
The Indian fleet was augmented by addition of a submarine force, acquisition of six Osa 
class missile boats from Soviet Union, and strengthening of surface fleet and naval air 
arm.178 
The Pakistan Navy was in no position to respond to the Indian naval 
challenge in the East, where it never maintained more than a gunboat squadron and a few 
old river craft on a permanent basis.  Even its capacity to undertake limited operations in 
the West was far from adequate.  To rectify the strategic posture submarine GHAZI was 
deployed to the Bay of Bengal.  However, after its reported loss on 3 December 1971, the 
Indian fleet faced virtually no opposition from the Pakistan Navy.  The carrier-based 
aircraft were extensively used by the Indian Navy against a variety of targets ashore.  A 
defensive minefield in the approaches to Chittagong port denied direct access to the 
Indian forces, which subsequently carried out an amphibious landing at Cox’s Bazar.  
This unchallenged presence of Indian Navy ruled out any possibility of reinforcement of 
troops in the beginning of the war or their withdrawal at a later stage.179 
In the western theater, Indian Navy successfully employed its Osa class 
missile boats and carried out two raids on shipping and shore installations at Karachi.  It 
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resulted in sinking of two Pakistan Navy ships and damaging another.  A few merchant 
ships at Karachi anchorage and an oil terminal at Keamari were also targeted during these 
raids.  The third missile attack by the Indian Navy was aborted after a successful attack 
by Pakistan Navy Submarine HANGOR on 9 December, which resulted in sinking of 
Indian Navy frigate KHUKHRI.  This modest success took the pressure off from 
Pakistani coast and restored the morale of officers and men.  Given its state of 
preparedness due continued neglect in the decade preceding the war and the lack of 
emphasis on the protection of sea communications, the Pakistan Navy was in no position 
to face the Indian threat.  The Indian attacks on Karachi confirmed that the threat to 
Pakistan was not purely over land.  It also exposed the vulnerability of Pakistan’s 
international commerce to interdiction.180        
d. The Post 1971 Consolidation Era  
Ironically, the loss the Eastern wing of the country in 1971 simplified 
much of the strategic planning for the navy, which could now concentrate its efforts in 
the west.  In the following decade, the navy kept on striving for improving its condition 
and explored diverse sources for procurement of equipment.  The naval air arm was 
strengthened by induction of Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft, Sea King and Alouette 
III helicopters.  Availability of the U.S. Navy Gearing class destroyers from late 1970s to 
early 1980s made up for acute shortages in the surface fleet.  Acquisition of two Agosta 
class submarines from France and a Daphne from Portugal gave a boost to the submarine 
force.  In 1982, Pakistan Navy bought a County class guided missile destroyer from 
Britain, which provided the much-needed platform for maintaining the training 
capability. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent resumption of 
economic and military aid by the United States offered new opportunities to the navy for 
its consolidation and development.  Acquisition of RGM 84 Harpoon missiles and their 
associated systems profoundly improved the offensive posture of the Pakistan Navy.  
These missiles were superior to Styx missiles in the Indian Navy and against which it did 
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not possess adequate defenses.181  An even significant development was the ability of 
Pakistan Navy to fire Harpoon missiles from its submarines, which further compounded 
the Indian Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) problem.  In the late 1980s, Pakistan Navy 
purchased two Leander class frigates from Britain and was able to secure the lease of 
eight Brooke and Garcia class frigates from the United States.  
e. Post Cold War Realities 
Soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and its 
subsequent collapse, the United States lost its interest in the region and Pakistan no 
longer remained “the bulwark of the American effort to contain the USSR.”182  In the 
middle of 1990, the United States imposed a fresh arms embargo, nicknamed the 
“Pressler Amendment” after its sponsor in the United States Congress, and intended to 
dissuade Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear weapons development effort.  The Pakistan 
Navy took the major brunt of these sanctions and any hope of a balanced fleet 
development withered away.  The ongoing deals for purchase of maritime patrol aircraft, 
helicopters, and Harpoon missile system were frozen.  The worst of all was the United 
States decision not to renew the lease of eight Brooke and Garcia class frigates after 
initial five years, which almost stripped bare the surface fleet of Pakistan Navy.  The deal 
to purchase six old Type 21 frigates form the United Kingdom served as a timely gap 
filler and Pakistan Navy once again returned to the hand to mouth existence of previous 
years.183 Nonetheless, Pakistan Navy managed to secure a deal for replacement of its 
elderly Daphne submarines and even older minesweepers.  In 1994 Pakistan signed a 
contract with France for the supply of three Agosta 90B submarines. The lead boat, 
KHALID, was built by DCN Cherbourg and entered service in December 1999, with the 
second and third boats being built in Pakistan with design and engineering support from 
DCN.  The second boat SAAD was commissioned in December 2003 and was the first 
ocean-going submarine ever built in Pakistan.  The third boat of the class is scheduled to 
begin sea trials in 2005, which will be fitted with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) 
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module incorporating the MESMA (Module Energie Sous-Marin Autonome) AIP 
plant.184 Induction of three Eridan class mine hunters in 1990s, last of which was built in 
Pakistan with French assistance, has significantly improved Pakistan Navy’s mine 
countermeasure capability.  The Pakistan Navy is also negotiating a deal for purchase of 
four Chinese frigates to augment its surface fleet. 
The Pakistan Navy is yet again faced by the problems that it has endured 
since its foundation.  Continuing emphasis on strengthening the land forces, coupled with 
meager resources of the state has made it increasingly difficult to create and maintain 
adequate naval force structure.  The recent shift in the U.S.-Pakistan relations and the 
consequent elevation of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally are interesting 
developments.  The prospective deal to purchase eight P-3C aircraft and six Phalanx 
Close-In Weapon Systems (and up gradation of existing six weapon systems) from the 
United States is a major development.185  Conclusion of this arms deal will enhance the 
existing capabilities of naval air arm and improve missile defense capabilities of surface 
ships.   
3. Reasons for Prolonged Neglect 
It is a general consensus that amongst the three armed services, the Pakistan Navy 
has remained the most neglected.186  An objective analysis is considered necessary to 
determine the reasons behind such neglect in order to devise an effective developmental 
strategy for the future.  
a. Physical Geography 
Pakistan's coastline stretches 1,046 kilometers from the Iranian border in 
the northwest to the Rann of Kutch, bordering India in the southeast.  There are a number 
of geographical factors that affect the development of the sea power.  With respect to its 
position vis-à-vis the adjacent sea and the land area, Pakistan occupies a ‘semi-central 
position,’ i.e., a country located on the rim of a continental land mass, but borders a sea 
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or an ocean.  Historically such position has not always been favorable to the development 
of sea power.187 Shape of country is yet another factor that may considerably affect its 
maritime development.  Pakistan’s physical shape best fits the description of a country 
with an ‘elongated shape’, where length of the country is at least six times greater than its 
width.  The land frontiers of a country with an elongated shape in combination with 
narrowness are difficult to defend against enemy invasion.  Such countries are usually 
forced to maintain large standing armies, thereby diverting resources from the 
development of their sea power.188  This description fits ideally in case of Pakistan, 
which faces an overwhelming threat over land border adjoining India.   
In addition the configuration of a country’s coast, the number and quality 
of natural harbors, physical character of the coastal area, abundance or scarcity of natural 
resources, and inland communications affect the development of sea power in varying 
degrees.  Pakistan’s coastline is sparsely populated with the exception of Karachi, the 
country's main port and commercial center.  West of Karachi, the coastal area has 
remained undeveloped with very limited communications (the coastal highway linking 
Karachi and Gwadar is presently under construction), mostly composed of barren and 
rugged mountains.  However, this underdevelopment and lack of communication 
infrastructure along the coast itself is a possible outcome of the continental mindset of 
policy makers in Pakistan.  This is because of the reason that a coast with well-developed 
road network and railways is more vulnerable to invasion by the sea, because it facilitates 
speedy advance of the enemy army into the country’s interior.  A coast without any, or 
only a few, lateral communications favors the defense, because it offers few access routes 
into the country’s interior for an army, which has been successfully landed on the 
coast.189  
b. Influence of Pakistan Army 
The Pakistan Army is the largest amongst the three armed services in 
Pakistan.  Because of its relative size and involvement in the political affairs of the 
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country, the Pakistan Army has always had an overarching influence in shaping the 
strategic perceptions of the country.190  The continental mindset of the army has had 
difficulty in envisaging a definitive role for the Pakistan Navy in the overall defense of 
the country.  In words of Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, “Military plans in Pakistan are focused 
on the thinking of the Army generals who have a ‘land locked’ approach which makes it 
difficult for them to appreciate the importance of naval defense.” 191  In theory the 
maritime component of the national military strategy of a sea power is not in an 
adversary relationship with the land power component.  However, in practice, the need to 
decide on the allocation of scarce resources produces tension between them.192  This 
becomes even problematic for smaller services in Pakistan because for them to have any 
in strategic planning or their ability to get their plans and acquisitions approved from the 
government, depended on their importance for the Army.193   While such alignments may 
be possible for the Air force to get its plans through, it has always remained an uphill task 
for the navy.       
Overemphasis on the land strategy in the overall strategic planning of 
Pakistan’s military leaders is akin to what Napoleon once believed, “Je veux conquerir la 
mer par la puissance de terre [I shall conquer the sea by the power of the land].”194  
However, he would have soon realized that “although great wars are usually fought and 
won on land, they are often decided at sea.”195  If history is of some consequence in 
evolution and development of military strategy, then policy makers in Pakistan have a 
great deal to learn from its own history.  The 1971 India-Pakistan War is one such 
historical example where a war conducted largely over land was influenced by the sea 
power.  The Pakistani land oriented strategy where it was believed that east could be 
defended only in the west, met a serious set back.  After the loss of Pakistan Navy 
                                                 
190 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurements and Military Buildup, 1979-99 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 60. 
191 Ibid., 64. 
192 Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, 13. 
193 Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurements and Military Buildup, 1979-99, 60 
194 Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War, 56. 
195 Robert Leckie, The Wars of America (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 603.  
 80
submarine GHAZI off the Indian east coast, the Indian Navy was able to operate with 
virtual immunity off East Pakistan, sinking shipping and launching carrier based air 
strikes.  The Indian Navy blockaded East Pakistan and extinguished any hopes of 
reinforcement from the west, which broke Pakistani morale and accelerated surrender.196   
c. Economic Constraints  
The navy is a capital-intensive and expensive service.  It needs money to 
buy ships, submarines, aircraft and other weapon systems, and for creating extensive 
maintenance and logistical facilities.  Technological sophistication has been an important 
factor in the burgeoning cost of naval equipment.  All defense inflation is higher than 
ordinary inflation but the rate tends to be worse for navies than it is for armies, because 
they are more capital intensive.  When planning their construction programs, navies deal 
with substantive amount of money at any one time.  It is for this reason that economic 
policy makers are often tempted to cut a warship out of the program because by doing so 
they are able to make immediate and significant savings.197  Furthermore the high cost of 
naval armaments makes them politically controversial, either in terms of where they 
should be constructed and by whom, or indeed of whether they should be built at all.198 
Nowhere in the world is the inherent conflict between economic 
development and strategic security as acute as in the Indian sub-continent.199  A secure 
defense is undoubtedly one of the greatest benefits that a state can confer upon its citizens 
but at the same time it must balance its resource distribution.  What is already spent on 
defense cannot be spent elsewhere.  More tanks, warships, and aircraft mean fewer 
hospitals, poorer schools, worse roads, and very little to spare for developmental work.200  
However, in face of the security threat faced by Pakistan, such hard choices remain 
unavoidable.  “Each has its price in terms of the alternative benefits that must be 
foregone.  People no more fill their bellies by buying guns than they defend themselves 
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by eating butter.”201  The severity of this dilemma is more in case of Pakistan because of 
its smaller economy and even poorer economic growth over the years.  All these factors 
make the matters worse for the Pakistan Navy being lowest on priority among the three 
services.  The limited amount of budget is barely sufficient for meeting running cost of 
existing fleet and leaves little room for improvement.  This is further compounded by 
lack of adequate technological base in the country to meet the challenges posed by ever 
advancing sophistication in naval weapon systems, forcing the navy to look for foreign 
sources, which are inherently expensive and are not always available due to dynamics of 
international politics.   
 
C. CHALLENGES 
1. Indian Navy Buildup 
India has a coastline of 6,300 kilometers with an additional 1,200 kilometers 
being added by the island territories of Lakshadweep, Andaman, and Nicobar islands.  It 
has 11 major, 20 intermediate ports, and over 100 minor ports.  The EEZ of India is 
approximately 2.2 million square kilometers.  India inherited similar continental outlook 
at the time of independence, however, Indian policy makers were quick to recognize the 
vital role their navy could play in maritime defense of the country.  While some Indian 
analyst may still argue that the growth of the Indian Navy has been slow due to lack of 
funds and lack of political and bureaucratic interests in maritime matters; such views are 
not substantiated by the facts.202  The development of the Indian Navy that started in 
mid-to-late 1960s has progressed gradually over the years.  Moreover, the success of the 
Indian Navy in the 1971 war with Pakistan created a new sense of confidence in the 
service and gave it a more prominent status within Indian defense structures.203    
Indian Navy is the fifth largest navy in the world, which is reasonably well 
balanced three dimensional force having modern missile-armed warships, an aircraft 
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carrier, minesweepers, advanced submarines and adequate air arm.  Indian Navy has an 
aspiration of acquiring a power projection posture, which is endorsed by the Indian 
government and supported by the population at large.  The future outlook of the Indian 
Navy is envisaged to be a strategic force centered around two carrier battle groups, 
nuclear-powered submarines and strategic bomber/maritime strike aircraft, playing a 
dominant role in the Indian Ocean region.  The development strategy of the Indian Navy 
is two pronged: there is an extensive indigenous program, which is supplemented by 
available defense procurements from abroad.  India has already successfully tested the 
nuclear power plant for its Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) cruise missile 
submarine.  The plans for indigenously built 32,000-ton aircraft carrier (Air Defense 
Ship) are well underway and it is expected to join the service by 2013.204 In January 
2004, India finalized its deal with Russia for purchase of aircraft carrier Admiral 
Gorshkov.  The aircraft carrier will be equipped with MiG-29K fighter jets, a mix of Ka-
28 ASW and Ka-31 AEW helicopters, and will be available to the Indian Navy by 2009 
after contractual modifications.205 Indian navy is also negotiating the purchase of 8-10 
refurbished Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion maritime strike/reconnaissance aircraft from 
the United States.206 
After conducting its nuclear tests in 1998, India declared that its minimum nuclear 
deterrence (MND) would be based on a triad of weapons delivered by aircraft, mobile 
land-based missiles and sea-based platforms.  The Indian Navy is poised to embrace a 
new maritime doctrine moving away from coastal protection to a more competitive 
strategy of developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrence, with view to dominate the 
Indian Ocean Region (IOR).  According to a semi-classified Indian Maritime doctrine 
released in April 2004, Indian Navy has clearly stressed the need to acquire a submarine-
based credible MND, which would enable India to pursue an “independent foreign policy 
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posture.”207  Apart from pursuing its indigenous Advanced Technology Vessel program 
and the associated development of ‘Sagarika’ submarine-launched cruise missile, the 
Indian Navy has reportedly entered into a covert agreement with Moscow for the lease-
purchase of two Akula class Type 971 nuclear powered submarine (SSNs) for around 
$700 million each, with the option of acquiring a third similar boat.  The first submarine 
would be reportedly handed over by 2004-05.208 
The Indian economy is evidently set on a path of reforms and is growing strongly.  
The present military balance in the sub-continent strongly favors India, and with every 
passing year, India’s superior economic performance will improve its military 
advantage.209  Indian Navy has a 5:1 advantage over the Pakistan Navy in terms of 
combat vessels, air assets and manpower.210  Indian strategists view the growth and 
development of the Indian Navy in line with its expanding maritime interests.  However, 
because of its security perceptions and continued rivalry with India, Pakistan can ill 
afford to ignore these developments.  This is a classical case of security dilemma where 
efforts by one country to improve its security make the other feel increasingly insecure 
and threatened.  In words of Philip Pugh: 
What one nation sees at its ample—but necessary—defense can appear to 
its neighbor as a threat indicative of aggressive intent and justifying 
counterbalancing increase in armaments.  Overprovision of defense may 
thus erode the very security that it seeks to ensure.211    
2. Have Nuclear Weapons Made the Pakistan Navy Irrelevant? 
It may be true that “nuclear weapons negate the advantages of conventional 
superiority because escalation in the use of conventional force risks receiving a nuclear 
strike.”212  But does it mean that nuclear weapons make conventional forces irrelevant?  
Or more specifically what is the need of maintaining a conventional navy if it makes no 
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difference in a total nuclear war?  This argument is not something new.  In fact it was the 
US Navy, which faced this question after the Second World War when policy makers 
started thinking out loudly about the utility of the navy in a nuclear environment.  This 
issue was debated in most of the 1950s, giving rise to a lot of skepticism against the role 
of navies.  The British Defense White Paper of 1957 mentioned that ‘the role of naval 
forces in total war is somewhat uncertain.’  In the United States this controversy created a 
good deal of inter-service rivalries, and the US Navy’s super carrier program was 
cancelled in favor of a bomber fleet armed with the new nuclear weaponry.213  The utility 
of conventional military forces in a nuclear environment was hotly debated right after the 
first and only use of nuclear weapons during the Second World War.  In words of 
Bernard Brodie: 
If our cities can be wiped out in a day, if there is no good reason to expect 
the development of specific defenses against the bomb, if all the great 
powers are already within striking range of each other, if even substantial 
superiority in numbers of aircraft and bombs offer no real security, of 
what possible avail can large armies and navies be?” 214 
 
The United States Navy, which is one of the most important elements of the U.S. military 
strategy, had to fight vigorously for its existence and genuinely feared that it would be 
reduced to a convoy-escort service.215  Brodie argued that while ships at sea were not the 
most attractive targets for atomic bombs and their ability to disperse made them 
comparatively wasteful targets, the question how their own security was affected was not 
the essential point.  He contended that destruction of major industrial cities in a nation 
would in anyway eliminate the need of seaborne trade to provide raw material for the 
industry and export of its finished goods and thus would have small use for a fleet to 
protect it.  Moreover, without the national industry to support it, the fleet would soon find 
itself without the means to function.  Brodie, therefore, concluded that “For it is still 
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possible for navies to lose all reason for being even if they themselves remain completely 
immune.”(Original in Italics)216   
The U.S. Navy was seen as “parochial and backward-looking, desperate to justify its 
existence in a world in which the reach of airpower was being extended all the time, and 
in which the most likely enemy was virtually land-locked and had only a slight maritime 
tradition.”217  With the assurance that bombing would provide in any future war, many 
Americans did not see any need to maintain a strong fleet.  A few months before the 
Korean War, the Secretary of Defense had even ruled out any possibility of amphibious 
operations by the U.S. Navy in the future, “amphibious operations are a thing of the past.  
We’ll never have any more amphibious operations.”218  Korean War was instrumental in 
silencing the critics who contended that navies were obsolete.  During the war the U.S. 
Navy met its challenges so well that within two years of the cancellation of the super 
carrier United States, six even larger carriers were laid down. 219   The successful 
construction of nuclear-powered submarines and their ability to fire ballistic missiles 
from a submerged position, which was first demonstrated by USS George Washington on 
20 July 1960 raised the curtain on a new age in warfare.220  The same navy, whose very 
existence was questioned by its critics, provided the most important element of the 
nuclear “triad.”221    
Broadly speaking, there are two supporting arguments for the need of the navy in 
a nuclear environment.  First, the introduction of nuclear weapons on sea-based platforms 
to attack land-based targets has made the navies more important than they ever had been 
before.222  Second, the nuclear weapons must be seen as a means of deterrence, rather 
than of war fighting.  The consequences of nuclear war are so destructive that they 
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inhibited the two super powers from using them during the Cold War.  Limited armed 
conflicts between two nuclear rivals without escalating to a total nuclear war, is not a 
very remote possibility.  It is therefore prudent for nuclear states to maintain credible 
conventional forces, so that they do not rely solely on nuclear deterrence that risks every 
thing.  Kenneth Waltz argues:  
Because strategic nuclear arms races among lesser powers are unlikely, 
the interesting question is not whether they will be run but whether 
countries having strategic nuclear weapons can avoid running 
conventional races.  No more than the United States will new nuclear 
states want to rely on executing the deterrent threat that risks all.  Will not 
their vulnerability to conventional attack induce them at least to maintain 
their conventional forces?223   
The nuclear deterrence in South Asia may have prevented a major war between 
India and Pakistan since 1998, despite the dangerous situation during Kargil conflict in 
1999 and the military standoff in 2001-02.  It may however, be noted that as yet both the 
countries do not meet all the requirements of an effective deterrence.224  Lack of a 
credible second-strike capability may invite preemption.  According to Barry Nalebuff, 
there are many reasons to fear an [preemptive] attack in an adversarial relationship: 
A country that fears it is in imminent danger of attack might prefer to 
preempt.  A country that perceives it has a dominant position may then 
feel forced to attack in order to prevent being preempted.  Whenever both 
sides see a change in their power relationship there is a mutual fear of 
preemption.225 
Moreover, the possibility of a breakdown in mutual deterrence can arise through 
two channels: quantity and quality.226 While quantity of nuclear weapons in case of India 
and Pakistan may not have a profound effect in the breakdown of mutual deterrence, the 
qualitative advantage that India is acquiring demands serious consideration.  India is 
acquiring three sophisticated Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
from Israel at a cost of $1.1 billion, which will be mounted on modified Russian IL-76 
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aircraft, scheduled to be delivered in 2005.227  India is reportedly interested in acquiring 
the Arrow theater ballistic missile defense system from Israel.  Developed jointly by 
Israel and the United States, Arrow is designed to intercept short and medium-range 
ballistic missiles at high altitudes, and could potentially be used by India to defend 
against Pakistan's nuclear-capable missiles.  And above all India is actively pursing 
development and acquisition of nuclear powered submarines and nuclear capable 
missiles.  It has already conducted a number of tests of the Indo-Russian joint venture 
Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, with nascent nuclear capability.228  Considering the 
likelihood that Israel already possesses submarine launched ballistic (or cruise) 
missiles229 and the fact that Israel has become India’s second largest military supplier 
after Russia, cooperation in the field of submarine launched ballistic/cruise missiles 
between India and Israel remains a credible possibility.  The recent statement of India’s 
chief military scientist Dr. V. K. Atre, lends further credence to this possibility, 
“Wherever they [Israelis] have strengths, we want to jointly develop the missiles so that 
both countries can benefit and share designs, costs and risks.”230    
In the light of above developments it would not be naïve to assume that combined 
together all these capabilities would tilt the qualitative edge unduly in favor of India, 
which may result in breakdown of mutual deterrence.  Pakistan has limited options in 
face of the changing environment.  Development of a sea-based second-strike capability 
is perhaps inevitable for Pakistan.  The policy makers in Pakistan will have to look 
beyond existing continental biases and assign the Pakistan Navy its rightful role in the 
overall strategic equation.  The efforts to acquire such technology would be challenging 
and would also require redistribution of existing resources, but at present there are 
obvious problems.  Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha argues: 
Important as it was to use the service [Pakistan Navy] for a second strike 
capability there were no obvious plans to integrate the Navy in the 
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nation’s nuclear planning…. Increasing options would also tantamount to 
the [Pakistan] Army giving an equal status to the other two services in 
military planning.  Developing a sea-based second strike capability 
requires procurement of Naval platforms capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads.  This would be tantamount to diverting resources from Army to 
the Navy, a development that the larger service might not currently 
support.231  
 
Limited war between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out in future despite the 
presence of nuclear weapons and the inherent danger of escalation.  This hypothesis is 
supported by the argument that India appeared convinced during the border crisis in 
2001-02 that Pakistan’s nuclear signaling was largely bluff and bluster, and in case of a 
conventional attack across the Line of Control, Pakistan would not use nuclear weapons 
unless a major city was under siege or its sovereignty threatened.  Moreover, India 
continues to perceive that it could credibly threaten the limited use of force, including 
surgical strikes in Pakistan administered Kashmir, without crossing Pakistan’s red lines.  
It is based on three assumptions.  First, escalation dominance favors India, so Pakistan’s 
most prudent response to ‘limited’ use of force would be limited and conventional.  
Second, India’s numerical superiority in nuclear weapons will deter Pakistan from a 
nuclear response.  Third, India’s large geographical size renders the state far better able to 
survive a nuclear exchange.232  
In a future conflict, India may attempt to exploit its overwhelming conventional 
superiority at sea.  This is because of the fact that naval forces are extremely flexible.  
They can be deployed at high seas, and pose a considerable threat without committing a 
single war like act.  Their mere presence and the possibility of a conflict in itself can 
seriously affect the seaborne trade by consequent increase in insurance charges and 
freight rates.  An argument by Rear Admiral Richard Hill is relevant in this regard:  
In terms of maritime strategy, it is unlikely that weapons of mass 
destruction will be widely deployed by new possessors among the medium 
powers.  Ballistic missile submarines, and or for that matter seaborne 
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nuclear cruise missile forces, are very expensive and difficult to organize. 
The sea will become more important in another way.  Given the prospect  
of mutual nuclear deterrence between medium powers confronting one 
another, a limited maritime dimension of conflict between them becomes 
more, not less, likely.233 
For Pakistan, the requirement to maintain some semblance of conventional naval 
balance with India is more important today than it was ever before.  If ‘weakness invites 
aggression,’ then it is as applicable to the naval forces as it is to the land forces.  
Weakness at sea increases the vulnerability and limits the option.  In theory “nuclear 
weapons have provided a land power with the physical means to thwart an enemy’s sea-
based strategy.”234  Or “a continental enemy could offset deficiencies in naval power by 
using or threatening to use nuclear weapons at sea.”235  However, in practice it may not 
be as simple.  While nuclear deterrence remains the weapon of the weak; total reliance on 
the “deterrent threat that risks all,” may not be a very prudent approach.  The alleged 
nuclear brinkmanship in the 1990 crisis and the overt nuclear threats made during open 
hostilities between India and Pakistan during the Kargil crisis in 1999,236 presumably 
were not well received by the international community, which is firmly behind the no use 
of nuclear weapons status quo maintained since the Second World War.  In order to 
effectively deter any misadventure by the Indian Navy in a future conflict and for the 
nuclear deterrence to work at its best, Pakistan will have to considerably improve the 
conventional war-fighting capability of its navy.   
3. Protection of Expanding Maritime Interests 
With the growing integration of world economy and the momentum towards 
globalization, Pakistan’s dependence on sea is bound to increase.  Development of 
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international trade and resource exploitation is often driven by global economic trends.  
According to Geoffrey Till, “However, centralized governments planning may be, the 
patterns of international trade and resource exploitation evolve through the action of 
many forces outside government control as well as some within it.”237 World trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) are identified as the two basic commercial activities that 
drive the global economy and provide the pillars supporting the economic 
interdependence in the world.  Since the end of Second World War, international trade 
has blossomed and increasingly fuels growth in domestic economies around the world. 
Over the last twenty years trade has become a significant part of the global economy and 
trends are toward greater increases. For example, one analysis predicts that trade’s share 
of world GDP; just 9 percent in the late 1970s will have exceeded 24 percent by 2005.238  
Pakistan’s economy is heavily dependent on its international trade, which is showing a 
steady growth.  In 2002-03, Pakistan’s external trade accounted for 36.3 percent of the 
GDP,239 95 percent of which is routed through the sea.  The recent economic stability in 
the country and the surge in GDP growth rate, which was 6.4 percent in 2003-04,240 are 
expected to increase the trade volume in future.     
Construction of a deep-sea port at Gwadar and the ongoing efforts for exploration 
of offshore resources in Indus Delta region further signify expansion of Pakistan’s 
maritime interests.  Since interests and vulnerability are correlated, expanding interests at 
sea would necessitate even greater emphasis on protection of these resources.  Inability of 
a country to provide protection to its seaborne trade may jeopardize economic growth and 
endanger national security.  According to Milan S. Vego:  
One of the main purposes of command of the sea in the past was, and 
remains, ensuring the safety of one’s own seaborne trade.  A country 
unable or negligent in the provision of protection to its seaborne trade will 
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suffer not only great damage but may also find its entire war effort 
doomed.241 
The Pakistan Navy within its existing resources and force structure is already 
overstretched vis-à-vis its roles and would require serious efforts for its development in 
order to ensure the protection of rapidly increasing maritime interests of the country.  
4. Institutional Barriers and Maritime Awareness 
Lack of maritime awareness in the masses and institutional impediments created 
as a result of this ignorance, are major obstacles in the development of maritime sector in 
general and the Pakistan Navy in particular. Traditionally, Pakistanis are not a sea faring 
nation and their knowledge about the sea and the enormous potential that it possesses is 
very limited.  Most of the people have never seen the sea primarily because of the 
remoteness of the sea from majority of the population.  Except from the port city of 
Karachi, the coastal belt along the Makran coast is very thinly populated.  Illiteracy is yet 
another reason for this lack of knowledge.  It would not be unfair to say that most of the 
educated class including the political elite has a very little understanding of the 
importance of the sea.  Since the politicians and for that matter the officer corps in the 
army are essentially part of the society, their inability to acknowledge the importance of 
the sea in terms of economic growth and national security ultimately results in the malign 
neglect of sea that is characterized as “sea-blindness.”242   
Promoting awareness about the sea and its resource potential, the role of the navy 
to safeguard these interests against predation, and above all the strategic role that the 
navy has to play in the deterring aggression and maintaining strategic stability is one of 
the biggest challenges faced by the Pakistan Navy.  Establishment of Pakistan Institute of 
Maritime Affairs (PIMA) by Vice Admiral H. M. S. Choudri in 1991 is a commendable 
effort in this direction.  The institute is dedicated to creating a greater awareness amongst 
the decision makers of the importance of maritime sector in fostering economic growth 
and ensuring national security of the country.243  For more than a decade the PIMA has 
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been making vigorous efforts to identify the inputs, which should go into the planning for 
an effective naval force, commensurate with the country's needs and resources, as well as 
into promoting the country's maritime interests as an important element of the nation's 
economy.  In the long run Pakistan Navy will have concentrate in promoting the 
importance of sea and its enormous resources through a multi-faceted strategy targeting 
general public and decision makers.  In this regard perhaps Pakistan can learn something 
from Brazil where “school teachers are mandated to inculcate a regard for the sea in their 
pupils.”244   
5. Economic Constraints and Technological Inadequacies  
A balanced navy, capable of contesting command at sea, is much more difficult to 
build than is a capable army sufficient for the task of taking war to the enemy on land.245  
Navies are difficult to build because of the resources, manpower, and the time they need 
to transform into an efficient war fighting force.  In words of Geoffrey Till: 
A navy is an inheritance not only of hardware and men but history, 
traditions, methods and concepts, as well as an amalgam of plans and 
projects for time to come; it cannot, anymore than can maritime economic 
power, be created overnight, nor in the normal state of affairs can its 
power be very quickly eroded.  Governments can of course alter the 
direction and emphasis of policy, but their room for maneuver is limited 
by the inertia of events.246 
Navies are and have always been expensive and arranging resources necessary for 
construction and maintenance of a navy is invariably demanding for all countries.  The 
problem for less developed countries is further aggravated with the rapid technological 
advancement witnessed in naval weapon systems and the inability of these countries to 
keep pace with these changes.  Geoffrey Till has quoted an Australian officer in one of 
his articles: 
[Navies] place heavy demands on the domestic resources of their nations 
and on the hard currency reserves of their governments.  Navies require 
substantial industrial and technological infrastructure to support their  
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activities, infrastructure which, in the case of the smaller services, may 
seem disproportionate in relation to the combat capability which it 
generates.247  
The problem for the Pakistan Navy are twofold; the limited size of country’s 
economy and the not so good economic performance in the past restrict defense spending 
despite the fact defense spending in the country has always been accorded the highest 
priority (at times foreign debt servicing exceeded the defense spending), and secondly the 
share of navy’s budget in the overall defense spending receives the least priority among 
the three services.  Due to the capital-intensive nature of the navy, any major 
development or acquisition program requires considerable amount of money at any one 
time, which in case of the Pakistan Navy remains a difficult proposition.  Observation of 
James Goldrick about the economic challenges faced by the Pakistan Navy in the 1990s 
is still relevant, “The very limited financial resources of the state and the continuing 
concentration upon the defense of the land border with India meant that it was practically 
impossible to create or maintain an adequate naval force structure without consistently 
high level of great power support.”248  
Modern warships, submarines, aircraft, and naval weapons systems incorporate 
advanced technology are increasingly becoming more sophisticated with every passing 
day.  In fact very few countries in the world can afford to build state of the art naval 
platforms or weapon systems because of the infrastructure, capital investment, and 
technological base.  The technological base in Pakistan is very limited and navy has to 
look for foreign sources to maintain and update its fleet.  However, there are two inherent 
problems with foreign sources; they are highly expensive, and they may not always be 
available due to dynamics of international politics.  These challenges have always been 
there and are likely to stay.  Pakistan Navy has understood these challenges very well and 
has made modest but concerted efforts in overcoming the technological barrier.  The 
maintenance infrastructure in the country has developed overtime and despite the 
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difficulties vis-à-vis availability of highly skilled manpower and the associated 
technological infrastructure, Pakistan Navy’s efforts in maintaining its existing fleet 
within available resources are commendable.  The most significant achievement is 
Pakistan Navy’s efforts in transfer of modern technology especially in the domain of ship 
construction.  For over a decade now, the Pakistan Navy has successfully embarked upon 
indigenous construction of missile boats, conventional submarines and mine hunters, with 
foreign assistance.  This has not only helped in developing the infrastructure needed for 
such mega projects, it has also helped in acquiring the necessary know how to undertake 
such projects in future. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The development of the Pakistan Navy has not been with commensurate with 
Pakistan’s growing strategic and economic maritime interests.  There are a number of 
reasons responsible for this neglect ranging from lack of maritime awareness, strategic 
culture of the country and physical geography.  However, the single most important 
factor had been the continental mindset of the army and its overwhelming influence in the 
strategic planning of the country—where navy has the least significant role, which also 
explains why the Pakistan Navy gets the least priority in resource distribution.  Failure of 
total reliance on land-based strategy in 1971 war with India has not changed the strategic 
perceptions of military planners.  Over the years the navy has managed to survive in face 
of both internal and external challenges such as resource constraints, inadequate 
technological base in country and military sanctions.  Looking in future, the challenges 
for the Pakistan Navy are growing.  The Indian Navy being the sole external threat enjoys 
an overwhelming advantage in quality and quantity over the Pakistan Navy and with 
sustained economic growth in India, the imbalance between the two navies is bound to 
increase.  Even alarming is the quest of India to acquire a sea-based second-strike 
capability and the vigor with which it is pursuing its goal.    
Though nuclear weapons are supposed to counterbalance the imbalance between 
conventional forces, yet relevance of the Pakistan Navy both in terms of a conventional 
as well as a strategic force is much more today than it had ever been before.  Not only 
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that Pakistan must concentrate on developing a sea-based second-strike capability, it must 
at the same time improve the conventional war fighting capability of its navy to deter any 
kind of aggression or misadventure by India in future.  To ensure stability in the region 
and for the nuclear deterrence to work at its best, the policy makers in Pakistan would 
have to see through the decades old continental biases and integrate the Pakistan Navy in 
the overall strategic planning.  Development of the navy is also to seen in light of ever 
expanding maritime interests of the country with increasing reliance on seaborne trade 
and a step towards offshore exploration.  In the long term, the navy must endeavor to 
promote maritime awareness amongst the masses in general and the decision makers in 
particular in order to change existing perceptions.  The immediate future, however, is 
unlikely to bring a major change in the situation and the Pakistan Navy will have to work 
its way through institutional, economic and technological difficulties.  Following 
recommendations are made with respect to the future development of the Pakistan Navy: 
• The policy makers in Pakistan must do a thorough reappraisal of the overall 
military strategy and recognize the importance of the Pakistan Navy as one of the 
most important pillars of the military strategy.    
• Pakistan must improve the conventional war fighting capability of its navy and 
initiate sustained efforts to make up the existing shortages in naval platforms and 
weapon systems.  While in the short-term Pakistan would continue to rely on 
foreign sources for advanced naval technology, the ongoing efforts to 
indigenously construct naval platforms must continue to reduce total reliance on 
foreign sources in the long-term. 
• Pakistan must pursue the acquisition of a sea-based second-strike capability and 
explore all available possibilities for acquisition of such technology.  
Redistribution of existing military resources may be made to finance this strategic 
requirement.  
• The Pakistan Navy must initiate a sustained campaign of educating the policy 
makers and the general public about the importance of the navy and its role in 


























 Pakistan, as a maritime nation, is heavily dependent on sea and its resources.  
More than 95 percent of Pakistan’s international trade is routed through the sea.  In 
addition sea is the major source of livelihood for people living along the coast.  Despite 
such dependence on seaborne trade and inherited access to sea and its resources, the 
maritime sector in Pakistan has remained neglected.  As a result of this neglect, the 
maritime sector has developed very slowly and is contributing insignificantly to the 
economic growth.  The Pakistan Navy shares the similar fate and receives the least 
priority amongst the armed forces.  This thesis argues that development of maritime 
sector in Pakistan is important for sustained economic growth and national security of the 
country. 
B. MAJOR FINDINGS 
The role of shipping industry is crucial in supporting the growth of international 
trade by providing an efficient and cost effective means of transportation. Due to its 
geography and the geo-political situation in the region, Pakistan is heavily dependent on 
sea for its international trade.  The sea carries over 95 percent of Pakistan’s trade, which 
is approximately 36.3 percent of its GDP.  However, despite such heavy reliance on 
seaborne trade, Pakistan’s shipping industry has remained neglected in the past.  The 
shipping industry in Pakistan started off at a good note and moderate growth was 
witnessed till early 1970s.  Thereafter it suffered because of the dismemberment of East 
Pakistan in 1971 followed by the unwise economic policies of the government in mid 
1970s.  Nationalization of the shipping industry was a major blow, which scared away 
private investors and subsequently the nationalized shipping corporation continued on a 
downward trend mainly because there was no competition from the private sector.  The 
downward trend has so far continued unabated.   
Development of shipping industry is important for Pakistan both in terms of 
economic growth and national security.  A healthy shipping industry can save foreign 
exchange expended on freight charges, earn additional revenues, provide added 
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employment opportunities, and most importantly protect and promote domestic trade 
from unfavorable rise in freight and insurance charges.  In terms of national security, a 
well-developed national merchant marine reduces the dependence on foreign carriers, 
which may not assure continuous supply in case of war or heightened tension.  This is 
especially relevant in case of Pakistan where national merchant marine transports only 5 
percent of the total cargo and risk of a conflict with neighboring India in future remains a 
possibility.  After decades of neglect, the government has realized that involvement of 
private sector is extremely important to achieve any meaningful development in the 
shipping industry.  The newly announced Merchant Shipping Policy by the government is 
generally considered as a step in the right direction.  The incentives announced in the 
policy were unprecedented in the shipping policies announced by the past governments.   
However, it is important for the government to prove its sincerity vis-à-vis 
promulgation of the policy and protection of genuine interests of the business community 
in addition to creating a level playing field to attract the private investors. The response 
of business community has not been very warm and they are extremely cautious in 
making a come back.  This cautious attitude of private investors is understandable 
considering enormous capital investment requirements and the checkered history of the 
treatment meted out to them in the past.  The government must make a thorough appraisal 
of the requirements of existing and potential investors and ensure that incentives offered 
are sufficient to inspire ideas of proportionate risk-taking.  Moreover, the bureaucratic 
institutions involved in functioning of shipping industry must be made business friendly 
and the legitimate right of business community to make profit must be acknowledged if 
any serious investment is expected in this sector 
Ports not only provide a link between the land and the sea transport, they are a 
great catalyst for generating economic activity in the region surrounding it.  Development 
of ports in Pakistan has remained slow in the past.  Pakistan has relied on the two co-
located ports at Karachi.  Considering Pakistan’s growing dependence on seaborne trade 
and the historical animosity with India, total reliance on ports situated in close proximity 
to India is strategically disadvantageous.  The coastline west of Karachi was not exploited 
till very late.  There is, however, a shift in the thinking of government, which has 
 99
embarked upon an ambitious program of developing Gwadar as a deep-sea port.  
Emergence of Gwadar port has tremendous economic potentials.  The port is envisioned 
to serve as a conduit for the trade of land-locked states of Central Asia and at some stage 
develop as a major transshipment port to serve the global seaborne trade in the region.  
Gwadar would also provide a strategically important base to the Pakistan Navy west of 
Karachi.  In addition construction of the port and related infrastructure would improve the 
socio-economic conditions of people in coastal areas.  The success and development of 
Gwadar as a major commercial port is not without its challenges.  The most important 
challenge is the internal security situation in the region and the concerns of the nationalist 
parties in Balochistan.  It is extremely important for the government to find a mutually 
accepted and long lasting solution to the problem and provide a secure environment for 
private investment, which is crucial for development of the port. 
The shipbuilding industry in Pakistan has not been able to operate profitably 
except for a brief period in the 1970s.  Lack of work has rendered the industry virtually 
idle except for the little support that it receives from the Pakistan Navy.  Despite all its 
economic difficulties, shipbuilding industry remains a strategic asset, which Pakistan 
cannot afford to lose.  Sustenance of shipbuilding is necessary to support indigenous ship 
construction efforts of the Pakistan Navy.  For the industry to become financially viable 
in the long term, the government must look for foreign investment preferably from China, 
which is emerging as a major shipbuilder in the world. 
The exploitation of offshore natural resources in Pakistan has progressed very 
slowly.  The country has a vast exclusive economic zone, which is potentially rich in both 
living and non-living resources.  However, in absence of scientific data and adequate 
oceanographic research, true extent of these resources is not known.  Exploitation of 
living resources is mainly limited to marine fisheries, which is the biggest source of 
employment in the coastal region.  The contribution of marine fisheries in the national 
economy has extensive potential to improve if Pakistan concentrates on exporting value 
added products as against raw fish and other fishery products.  The existing fishing fleet 
of Pakistani fishermen needs to be modernized for better exploitation and preservation of 
living resources in the EEZ.  Exploration of offshore energy resources has gained some 
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momentum in the recent years because of attractive policies promulgated by the 
government.  However, the results of these activities are known as yet.  Two major 
challenges in this regard are the high level of marine pollution, which is damaging the 
offshore living resources and the limited time available for preparation of scientific data 
for claiming the continental shelf beyond the EEZ.   
The Pakistan Navy as an element of military power at sea has always remained 
neglected because of the continental mindset of the ruling elite and overwhelming 
influence of the army.  Such attitude has hampered the development of the navy, which is 
in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Indian Navy.  Failure of total reliance on land-
based strategy in 1971 war with India has not changed the strategic perceptions of 
military planners.  Over the years the navy has managed to survive in face of both 
internal and external challenges such as resource constraints, inadequate technological 
base in country and military sanctions.  Looking in future, the challenges for the Pakistan 
Navy are growing.  The Indian Navy being the sole external threat enjoys an 
overwhelming advantage in quality and quantity over the Pakistan Navy and with 
sustained economic growth in India, the imbalance between the two navies is bound to 
increase.  Moreover the Indian Navy is vigorously pursuing its goal to acquire a sea-
based second-strike capability, which will destabilize the strategic balance in absence of a 
similar capability with Pakistan.    
Though nuclear weapons are supposed to counterbalance the imbalance between 
conventional forces, yet relevance of the Pakistan Navy both in terms of a conventional 
as well as a strategic force is much more today than it had ever been before.  Not only 
that Pakistan must concentrate on developing a sea-based second-strike capability, it must 
at the same time improve the conventional war fighting capability of its navy to deter any 
kind of aggression or misadventure by India in future.  To ensure stability in the region 
and for the nuclear deterrence to work at its best, the policy makers in Pakistan would 
have to see through the decades old continental biases and integrate the Pakistan Navy in 
the overall strategic planning.  Development of the navy is also to seen in light of ever 
expanding maritime interests of the country with increasing reliance on seaborne trade 
and a step towards offshore exploration.  In the long term, the navy must endeavor to 
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promote maritime awareness amongst the masses in general and the decision makers in 
particular in order to change existing perceptions.  The immediate future, however, is 
unlikely to bring a major change in the situation and the Pakistan Navy will have to work 
its way through institutional, economic and technological difficulties.  
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Major recommendations of the thesis are summarized below: 
• The government must restore the lost trust of business community in order to 
attract investment in shipping sector.  The government must demonstrate sincerity 
in promulgating the declared policy and its actions must conform to the policy 
guidelines. 
• The government must make a thorough appraisal of the requirements of existing 
and potential investors and ensure that incentives offered are sufficient to inspire 
ideas of proportionate risk-taking.  The incentives offered should be equal to 
those offered elsewhere in the world especially in the open-registry countries.   
• The right of private sector to make legitimate profit must be acknowledged and 
the government must ensure that both private and public sectors are treated 
equally.  This should apply to award of any subsidies, special cargo allocation 
quotas, or award of contracts for transportation of cargo. 
• The government should consider setting up of a separate ministry for the shipping 
industry for effective coordination of shipping requirements of various 
government agencies and for removing bureaucratic snags, which hamper smooth 
and efficient conduct of business activities.  
• The government must address the security related issues in Gwadar and reach a 
negotiated solution with the nationalist elements in Balochistan taking due 
cognizance of their grievances.  It is important for envisaged future investment by 
the private sector. 
• The government must explore the possibility of joint collaboration with China for 
long-term economic revival of domestic shipbuilding industry.   
• The problem of marine pollution is seriously degrading the living resources and 
needs immediate attention.  The government must devote more efforts to control 
and drastically reduce the damage being done by unchecked pollution. 
• In order to submit its claim for continental shelf beyond the EEZ, the government 
must accelerate its effort to gather the scientific and technical data necessary for 
submitting the claim before the final date in 2009. 
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• The policy makers in Pakistan must do a thorough reappraisal of the overall 
military strategy and recognize the importance of the Pakistan Navy as one of the 
most important pillars of the military strategy.    
• Pakistan must improve the conventional war fighting capability of its navy and 
initiate sustained efforts to make up the existing shortages in naval platforms and 
weapon systems.  While in the short-term Pakistan would continue to rely on 
foreign sources for advanced naval technology, the ongoing efforts to 
indigenously construct naval platforms must continue to reduce total reliance on 
foreign sources in the long-term. 
• Pakistan must pursue the acquisition of a sea-based second-strike capability and 
explore all available possibilities for acquisition of such technology.  
Redistribution of existing military resources may be made to finance this strategic 
requirement.  
• The Pakistan Navy must initiate a sustained campaign of educating the policy 
makers and the general public about the importance of the navy and its role in 
national security of the country.   
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